




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JPRS Report



Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Military for Democracy Sees 'Totalitarian Mentality'

924C2031A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Anna Yulianova: "Interparty Council Against the 'Ministry of War'"]

[Text] An interparty council on military policy held on 16 July by the Military for Democracy Movement's Coordinating Council adopted an appeal to all democratic forces in Russia, warning of the threat posed to legitimate authority by military circles. "Within the leadership organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Security, the procuracy and the armed forces people who are actively opposed to democratic change predominate," states the appeal. This could lead to the creation of "an authoritarian power prepared to grow into a dictatorship." The council featured harsh criticism of the Ministry of Defense leadership, "a group of aging generals with a totalitarian mentality." Speakers stressed the need for establishment of mechanisms of civilian control over force structures. Among those signing the appeal were the SDPR [Social Democratic Party of Russia], the RPRF [Republican Party of the Russian Federation], the RKhDS [Russian Christian Democratic Party], the Russian Shield Union, the Union of Democratic Forces imeni Sakharov, and the Moscow Nobles' Assembly.

The interparty council discussed the alarming social situation of military personnel in Russia. According to Yuriy Deryugin, a member of the Coordinating Council of the Military for Democracy Movement, "we are on the brink of a social explosion within the armed forces." Leonid Shpigel, secretary of the Economic Freedom Party [Partiya ekonomicheskoy svobody], reported in a speech to the council that business people are prepared to lend their support to social programs to provide support for demobilized military personnel.

Moscow Military Draft More Successful Than Last Year

924C2014A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by Andrey Bayduzhiy under the heading "The Army": "Moscow's Young Men Eager To Serve in the Transcaucasus and in the Navy"]

[Text] The idea that military service today is something extremely unpopular has been so often repeated that the mass media hastened to report that the latest armed forces induction was a complete failure even before it was over. Anatoliy Alekseyev, chairman of the Russian Presidential Committee on Military Personnel and Family Members even gave this specific figure for Moscow: [word indistinct] inductees reported to the assembly point.

However, according to Col. Vladimir Dobrovolskiy, deputy military commissar of the City of Moscow, the current induction campaign in the capital has gone off in a more organized manner than ever before. Almost 100 percent of the new recruits expected under the induction plan did in fact enter the armed forces. By comparison, last year that figure was only 98 percent, and two years ago it was 80 percent. The reasons for this phenomenon in Moscow are still unclear, but obviously the main role was played by two factors: reduction of the length of service and severe restrictions on deployment of Russia's young men to hot spots within the CIS, or anywhere outside Russia's borders at all.

According to Vladimir Dobrovolskiy, this year the capital did not send a single recruit either to Moldova or the Baltic republics. Only 29 men went to the Western Group of Forces, as compared to the hundreds sent there previously. Incidentally, contrary to a widespread opinion, the military commissariats have no interest in sending their recruits to distant places and various hot spots around the former Union—that only creates more problems for the officers. Though, strange as it may seem, there is no lack of volunteers for service in those places. For example, every year dozens of applications from men wanting to serve in the Transcaucasus cross the deputy commissar's desk, and this latest induction campaign was no exception. Only after "a great deal of explanatory efforts" did the number of those wishing to go there shrink to a fraction of its original size; only five particularly persistent volunteers got their wish and actually shipped out for the former Transcaucasus Military District.

Since reduction in the length of service the number of those wanting to serve in the navy has increased markedly. This year the fleet received one Muscovite recruit in three; approximately 600 men were sent to the Black Sea, but not to Russia's Novorossiysk instead of the Ukrainian Crimea or Odessa.

Among the distinctive features of this year's draft was the almost complete absence of draftees from among working-class young people. Only one in ten young men of draft age now serves in the armed forces. Even in the past the tremendous number of higher educational institutions in the capital made life difficult for rayon military commissariats, but today, with new higher educational institutions are springing up virtually every day, it has become completely impossible to determine the total number of eligible draftees. You no longer need to hide from the military commissariat or feign insanity to avoid military service. For a relatively small sum of money and without even taking entrance exams you can get a student identification card, all quite legal, and thereby have legitimate grounds to avoid service. It seems that many of the higher educational institutions now opening up department charging fees were counting on that very contingent of students. And so today not only the dumbest serve in the army, but also the poorest—the ones who do not have enough money to gain admission to a higher educational institution.

Incidentally, even when there is every reason to prosecute those who evade military service, it is virtually impossible to do so. Article 80 of the Criminal Code, which prescribes penalties for that crime, is no longer functional. Overworked judges hear those cases last of all, and you could count on your fingers the number of convictions handed down in connection with them over the past several years.

The city military commissariat is particularly concerned about the qualitative makeup of the recruits it is receiving. Moscow's young people have never been particularly noted for their good health. Today there are virtually no healthy young people left. Over 80 percent of Moscow draftees have restrictions on their fitness for military service. Moreover, recently the situation has begun to worsen disastrously. In just one year the number of individuals exempted from military service for health reasons has risen by 50 percent. Whereas in all of last year that number totalled 12,000, during the first six months of this year it has already reached 8,000. If that rate keeps up, then in a few years the military will have to be scaled back because of a lack of healthy soldiers instead of a lack of funding.

Health status is not the only criterion on the basis of which draftees are sent to various branches of service. The construction battalions still get the worst contingent of draftees. Under an order issued by the minister of defense, young men who have managed to get themselves convicted before they reach draft age may serve only in the construction units. There was a total of 212 such individuals in Moscow this year. Approximately 300 more were allowed to postpone their service because they were facing prosecution at the time they were drafted.

Recently the Moscow Military Commissariat has also had to deal with an unaccustomed problem: service assignments for soldiers who refused to swear a military oath and quit units in the other states of the former Union. The exodus from Ukraine and the Central Asian republics has been particularly large. These soldiers arrive at the military commissariat singly or in unit strength, often unaccompanied by an officer and sometimes without documents. Under these conditions it is impossible to determine who actually left their places of service for ideological reasons, and who simply deserted in search of a better life, but all those who come to the military commissariat voluntarily are sent without unnecessary complications to complete their service within Russian territory.

CIS: POLICY

Yeltsin Decree on Funding Military Housing

92UM1346A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Aug 92 p 2

[Russian Federation Presidential Decree No 796 signed by B. Yeltsin, 21 July 1992, Moscow, the Kremlin:

"Russian Federation Presidential Decree 'On Additional Steps for Financing Construction and Acquisition of Housing for Servicemen'"]

[Text] To improve the provision of housing for officers, army and naval warrant officers and extended service military personnel, I decree that:

1. The Russian Federation Government will provide for the allocation of funds in the budget for 1992 and for the first half of 1993 to ensure the introduction of a total of 3,397,000 square meters of housing for servicemen and for 2,098,000 square meters for individuals who have been released from military service with the division by year: no less than 60 percent in 1992 and 40 percent in the first half of 1993.

2. The executive organs of state power of the republics, krais, oblasts and autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg will allocate housing (individual apartments) to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Russian Federation Ministry of Architecture, Construction and Housing-Utilities (Railroad Troops Main Directorate), the Committee for the Protection of the State Border, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Federation Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the Russian Federation President, and the Russian Federation Main Security Directorate for sale in the prescribed manner based upon their requests to provide housing to servicemen without apartments and to those needing improved housing conditions.

3. The Russian Federation ministries and departments listed in paragraph 2 of this Decree render financial assistance at no charge at the duty location in the amount of 75 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or bank credit received for the construction of individual homes with interest for the use of credit to servicemen who have 10 or more calendar years of unblemished and uninterrupted military service who have entered into housing-construction (housing) cooperatives or who are carrying out construction of individual homes, including servicemen who have been granted the right to enter into such cooperatives or to build individual homes at a location other than the duty location by legislation that is in force. Establish that 25 percent of the indicated amount of financial assistance at no cost are from outside budget resources of Russian Federation ministries and departments and also of budget resource savings based on the estimate for their maintenance.

The remaining 25 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or bank credit received for the construction of an individual home with interest for the use of credit is paid using the servicemen's monetary resources in rubles or foreign currency.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the

Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Russian Federation Ministry of Architecture, Construction and Housing-Utilities (Railroad Troops Main Directorate), the Committee for the Protection of the State Border, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Federation Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the Russian Federation President, and the Russian Federation Main Security Directorate determine the procedures for granting financial assistance at no cost, including by attracting outside budget resources, and also servicemen's personal monetary resources for the construction or acquisition of housing.

5. Within a month, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, based upon coordination with interested ministries and departments, will prepare and submit through the Russian Federation President's State Legal Directorate a draft Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the procedures for selling and utilizing surplus military equipment, having stipulated in it that the resources from the sale of this property will be directed toward the financing of the construction and acquisition of housing and the resolution of other social problems of servicemen and their family members. In the process, prohibit the participation of military management organs (other than cost-accounting enterprises and organizations), and also servicemen in the activities of commercial structures.

6. The Russian Federation Government will bring previously issued normative acts on these issues into compliance with this Decree.

7. Recognize that paragraph 7 of Russian Federation Presidential Decree No 154, 19 February 1992, "On Steps To Increase the Social Protection of Servicemen and Individuals Who Have Been Released From Military Service" and Russian Federation Presidential Decree No 198, 27 February 1992, "On Additional Steps for the Social Protection of Armed Forces Servicemen" as no longer being in force.

8. This Decree enters into force the moment it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
Russian Federation President
Moscow, the Kremlin
21 July 1992
No 796

Grachev Cited on Planned Meeting With Defense Leadership

92UM1351A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 31 Jul 92 p 4

[Comments by Army General Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense of Russia, under the rubric "Information Contact": "A Non-Astrological Forecast"]

[Text] Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense of Russia; "We shall complete the first phase in the building of a Russian army...."

In the remaining five months of this year we shall complete the first phase of military organizational development in Russia:

- take a thorough and objective inventory of existing weapons and military equipment;
- determine at the interstate level the status of Russian forces located outside of Russia;
- continue the planned withdrawal of troops and make arrangements for their lives;
- continue planned reductions in the numerical strength, armaments and military equipment;
- develop the legal basis for the organizational development and the functioning of the armed forces of the Russian Federation;
- restore the Ural Military District and reform other military districts.

From the editors:

Every sentence in this forecast, terse in the military manner, will undoubtedly touch the lives of hundreds and hundreds of people and affect our state's prestige and military might. We therefore intend in the immediate future to meet with the leadership of the armed forces of Russia in order to publish a more detailed and substantive discussion on the matter in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*. And you, our readers, can take part in it by calling in your questions to us at the following number:

257-25-20, Military Department

Manilov Comments on Main Command Priorities

92UM1347A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 4 Aug 92 p 3

[Interview with CIS Unified Armed Forces Information Services Chief and Press Secretary Lieutenant-General Valeriy Manilov by Vladimir Shchedrin: "There is a Commander-in-Chief. There Will Also Be Strategic Forces"]

[Text] The CIS Unified Armed Forces Main Command is an interstate organ coordinating the efforts of the Commonwealth states, first of all of the participants of the Tashkent Treaty "On Collective Security" in the area of defense. CIS Unified Armed Forces Information Services Chief and Press Secretary Lieutenant-General Valeriy Manilov discusses its tasks and the main directions of activities.

[Manilov] We can consider four directions in the activities of the Main Command to be priority directions: single control and centralized command and control of strategic forces, improvement of their structures and maintenance of combat readiness at the required level in the interests of the CIS; coordination of the efforts of the Commonwealth states to provide collective security, reform of the Armed Forces and development of primary

doctrinal tenets; implementation of timely and coordinated steps to maintain peace in the CIS and to prevent local conflicts on the external borders...

[Shchedrin] Please tell me about the specific steps that the Main Command is planning on conducting prior to the end of 1992.

[Manilov] In the political sphere, we are faced with developing and submitting a number of documents specifically associated with the adoption of a provision or convention on the main command for the approval of the Council of Commonwealth Heads of State. A list of division-sized and smaller units that will be part of the Strategic Forces is being developed.

In the operational sphere, we are beginning a great deal of work for the practical creation of groups of military observers and collective forces for maintaining the peace in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Shchedrin] Who will be part of these collective forces?

[Manilov] Their composition was defined by the Tashkent Protocol that was signed on 16 July 1992. Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will assign their armed contingents.

Need for Rethinking Doctrine, Strategy Seen

924P0150A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Daniil Proektor: "Opinion: What Are the Real Threats We Face? More on Russian Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Now, as the Russian army is being formed, objective assessments of where there is danger and where there is none, where danger could arise and where the notorious "images the enemy" have simply been constructed, are just as crucial as the selection of a seismically inactive site for the construction of a nuclear power plant: Miscalculations are too dangerous.

No, I am by no means proposing that we "totally eliminate" preparations for possible "external" conflicts, which is what General Larionov is accusing me of, apparently, due to a misunderstanding. I only want to focus attention on the fact that in this changed world, the nature of military policy has changed as well, including the direction of the dangers and threats for the new Russia and for the CIS. Once again I will make bold to affirm an idea that has been mentioned before: Despite the large number of dangers and threats, the international situation for Russia on the whole now is more favorable than it has been at any other time in the 20th century. The main threats have shifted to within the CIS. There is no danger, for example, that we are suddenly going to be attacked by American missiles or that the Bundeswehr is going to embark on a military campaign.

This is truly the case, at least for the foreseeable future, although my opponent does not entirely agree with this

and is vigilantly warning military theoreticians "not to share the views of Professor Proektor."

That's right. You don't have to "share" them. All you have to do is open up the day's newspapers every morning and turn on the television in the evening. Then you don't need any professors to realize what's going on. Who wants to work "all together" to help us get out of this quagmire, and who is dragging us into one, stirring up the fierce and bloody conflicts and wars along the entire crumbling southern periphery of the CIS, which is already turning into a belt of human destruction covering a vast area from Yugoslavia, Moldova, and the Dniester region, through the Caucasus to Central Asia. Drawing in neighboring ethnic groups, the flame is already moving toward the center of Russia, toward the capital's television towers, throwing off showers of sparks, which are more and more coming to resemble swastikas. Chauvinism is filling up the vacuum left by the disappearance of internationalism. Hundreds of conflicts are ready to explode under the fire from the mass of "ownerless" weapons. These conflicts are more dangerous than those that led to the first and second world wars because then the armies were kept under control somehow, their arsenals were not plundered by countless military detachments given over to anarchy, and there were no atomic bombs.

With the development of events of this nature at the end of the 20th century, Europe and the world could arrive at an even worse development of events than what happened in the beginning and middle of the century. The Helsinki structure in Europe, which was created with such difficulty, could be destroyed, and a chain reaction of crises could cause a massive regrouping of forces and a new outburst of militarism, fascism, and splintering.

This must be halted at any price. Only we ourselves are capable of doing this. From within. Perhaps through the creation of a confederation along the lines of the EEC. With the support of the entire world community, which is troubled by our excesses, perhaps more than some of us are. We are so accustomed to the old images of the "external enemy," and meanwhile the flame is burning within.

In addition to everything else, shouldn't we realize more profoundly that in the new world, the traditional relationship between peace and war has changed? That wars between developed states are senseless and impossible? That the sphere for the use of force is shrinking, and that in places where before you would have heard arms rumbling right away, politics is doing the talking now?

The dangers for our country are going to depend not only on possible drastic changes in the world situation and the balance of forces, which cannot be foreseen, but much more than before, on ourselves, on our domestic policies. We will make friends for ourselves and live more peacefully if we bring these torturous reforms to a successful conclusion, become a democracy, and join the world community. We will be surrounded by enemies if we

break off the reforms and democracy, if we move the internal political axis to the right, if we return to neo-Stalinism and supermilitarization.

Then there will be a second cold war, which we will certainly not be able to survive. The more obstacles that appear on the path of reform and the more hysterical the demonic nationalist mentality becomes, the more quickly others will turn away from us and the more quickly we will move toward another state of international isolation and collapse.

So that is what I mean when I write that "internal threats" are becoming more and more dangerous. But please do not accuse me of underestimating everything else. The world is seething and churning, upheavals may lie ahead of us that we cannot even imagine now. All of this is so obvious that it is embarrassing to speak about it in a debate that is even the least bit serious. After all, even A. Kuprin's unforgettable semiliterate soldier from *Poyedinok* (The Duel) told the sergeant-major at a "literature lesson" that "there are external enemies and there are internal enemies." Does this need to be proven in a contemporary debate between a general and a professor?

No, I am not saying that the threat from the outside has "disappeared entirely." I am in favor of an updated, modern, mobile army that is worthy of Russia, I am in favor of a common security space for the CIS, of social protection for soldiers and officers. This kind of army would not be necessary if the threat had "disappeared entirely." Could I, having given three decades to military service, really think differently?

But we need to see the new architecture of security in Europe and the world, which may be what lies ahead for us, and we should carry out our military building in accordance with this. Without making any claims whatsoever about the truth, I will take the liberty of laying out in brief my own vision.

Most likely, the key structural elements of this architecture are not going to be wide-reaching wars that end with treaties such as those signed in Vienna or Versailles, but rather pan-European rapprochement and unity within the structures of the CSCE, expanding beyond the borders of Europe and America. Then, there will be a European Union, which will gradually attract and draw in more and more Eastern European countries. And NATO, as a tough, yet flexible, defense and political rod of support. The disarmament process. And most important, the new Russia as a future, and we hope, most important element of European and global stability.

The future security of Europe depends on Russia and on each Russian citizen, no matter what his nationality. This, if you will, is Russia's historic mission, its new global destiny.

It seems to me that Russian military doctrine in the future, about which so much is being said, should

proceed from these premises. I am not sure that we are completely clear on this score.

V. Larionov considers military doctrine "the algorithm of military building, in which everything is predetermined by directive.... Strategy contains different alternatives and it is democratic, it allows a competition between opinions and motives, which doctrine does not allow after it has been adopted."

It would have been great if Marshal Zhukov and his generals in that earlier war had followed the prewar doctrine with its mass of archaic principles, if they had not had "their own opinions and motives," that is, if they had not been creative. It was through their creativity that they contributed to our salvation.

And really, generally speaking, in our very dynamic times can we draw up any long-term doctrine "by directive"? The situation, the technology, change every year, if not every month. For example, in May 1987 we announced with great fanfare, at the highest level, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member-states. And what is left of it after two or three years? The Warsaw Pact itself is gone!

So, this year we are formulating a new doctrine. Is it really going to "predetermine everything" "by directive" up to the year 2000—which is the approximate deadline that has been announced for the completion of the military reforms? Come on!

That is why in an absolute majority of major states and in NATO they do not talk about doctrines, but about "strategies," "concepts," views, or whatever you like, the point is not the name, but that all of this is constantly being changed and adjusted, as life demands, not as the "algorithms" demand, no matter how scientific they may sound. That's how we should do it, too!

I ask my opponent, whom I have sincerely respected for a long time, to take what has been presented here only as individual ideas, which are certainly not indisputable. Because I always remember the precept of Michel Montaigne: "Stubbornness and excessive ardor in a debate are the clearest signs of stupidity." And I certainly do not want to come across that way.

Discussion of Social Support to Servicemen at Yeltsin Meeting

92UM1326A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Pavel Felgengauer: "Yeltsin Allocates More Than 90 Billion Rubles for Housing Construction for Servicemen: It Is Still not Entirely Clear Where Those Funds Will Come From"]

[Text]

The Army

On 21 July at his residence in the Kremlin President Yeltsin met with the heads of local administration (republics within the Russian Federation were represented by their prime ministers or by their deputies) and also with military district, groups of forces, and fleet commanders. Gaydar, Burbulis, Makharadze, Boldyrev, Primakov, and Barannikov were also at the meeting and First Deputy Ministers of Defense General Dubynin and Andrey Kokoshin represented the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conference was devoted to the problems of social protection of servicemen.

Several dozen Soviet and foreign correspondents had been invited and had been warned that they would have to leave the hall in 5-7 minutes. However, they were forced out earlier. Yeltsin ended his first sentence and then told the journalists that they "were interfering with the work" and that this was a "working conference and not a ceremonial one", and that "maybe we will have to remove someone from his job and television is here".

They crowded the press out into the vestibule and promised that they could expect a briefing by Press Secretary Kostikov.

I managed to form some notion of the state of social protection of servicemen from a handful of the most stubborn who waited until the end of the conference, from the words of eyewitnesses I know and also with the help of the press secretary.

Yeltsin was in a fighting mood and (in the press secretary's words) he "ranted and raved": he had only limbered up on the press but he seriously went after the heads of local administration. The 19 February Decree which directed all Russian Federation local authorities to eliminate the debt of housing allocated to servicemen in the first quarter of 1992 is not being executed and may serve as the cause of social upheaval. On Russian territory, there are 167,000 servicemen without apartments and 82,000 servicemen who need improved housing conditions. Troop withdrawals are in the offing and there will be even more homeless servicemen. Specifically, we will have to accelerate the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic Region as a result of pressure from the world community. Based on predictions, another 240,000 apartments will be required. The local authorities are not paying back the housing debt under conditions of a drastic reduction of housing construction. (4,529 apartments have been turned over during the last six months). Furthermore, newly-built housing frequently belongs not to the state as before but to certain "owners" who do not want to share with the military even "in execution of presidential decrees".

The president enumerated oblasts, krays and republics that are especially persistently violating the decree. It was suggested that the lackadaisical ones "in an adequately abrupt form" (in the press secretary's words) deal with the problem otherwise severe retribution, right

up to removal from a job, will follow in the very near future. In general, "the period of criticism of the armed forces has passed".

But then again, the Ministry of Defense also caught hell. Abuse of official position, bargaining away military equipment, corruption, and merging with commercial structures. (Yuriy Boldyrev cited specific examples of the theft of millions of rubles and dollars by commercial structures that had existed under the previous union ministry of defense and CIS commander-in-chief directorate). The Ministry of Defense was authorized to sell military vehicles and equipment at market prices and to use the proceeds to construct housing. During one year, R2 billion of outside budget resources were received but they were not spent on the purchase of housing.

It was proposed to transform the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Chairman—Aleksandr Temerko) into the Interdepartmental Committee for the Coordination of All Systems of Social Protection. The creation of farms by former officers will be encouraged. All servicemen have already been released from income taxes.

Before those present, Yeltsin signed an decree on additional appropriations for housing construction. It allocated R89 billion in order to construct 5,000,000 square meters of housing (3,000,000 for servicemen; 2,000,000 for former servicemen). Of them R50 billion are at the expense of the budget, R39 billion from outside budget resources (from the calculation of R15,000 per square meter). Sixty percent of the housing must be built by the end of 1992 and 40 percent by the end of 1993. Furthermore, the state will compensate servicemen for 75 percent of the cost of housing purchased or built by them, 50 percent at the expense of the budget and 25 percent from Ministry of Defense outside budget resources. That same decree authorized the armed forces to sell "freed up military equipment and vehicles" to solve social issues and housing construction. However, Russian Army personnel are prohibited from participating in the activities of commercial structures. So, the procedures for the sale of military equipment must be formulated in the very near future. The decree enters into force immediately, although the exact sources of its financing (both budget and outside budget) are not entirely clear.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Specification, Performance of 'SMERCH' MLRS

92UM1332B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel Aleksey Aboronov: "SMERCH" Doesn't Have Any Analogues]

[Text] Today for the first time we are acquainting KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers with the native multiple rocket launcher system (RSZO) which has received the

awesome and expressive name "SMERCH" [tornado]. Based on the assessments of both our and foreign military experts, it exceeds the latest multiple rocket launcher systems that have been developed in other countries, including MLRS that began entering the inventory of the U.S. Army in 1981 and was used in the war against IRAQ. So, the priorities that have been reaffirmed since the times of the famous Katyushas have still not been lost.

The "SMERCH" multiple rocket launcher system consists of combat and loader/transporter vehicles. This self-propelled launcher consists of an artillery portion and a MAZ-584M motor vehicle chassis. The loader/transporter vehicle which carries 12 projectiles is based on that same chassis. It is equipped with a crane.

The combat vehicle has a four-man crew and the loader/transporter has a three-man crew. The weight of the loaded combat vehicle is 43,700 kilograms and the loaded loader/transporter weighs 40,500 kilograms.

The "SMERCH" multiple rocket launcher's minimum firing range is 20 kilometers and maximum firing range is 70 kilometers.

We must also mention that during the development of this system, that is manufactured by the Perm machine builders, we exceeded our foreign competitors not only in the firepower of the artillery portion but also in the quality of the automated fire control system (ASU). Tomsk residents deserve credit for that ("Kontur" Production Association). In any case, the "SMERCH" automated fire control system exceeds the fire control apparatus used by the Americans in a number of very important indicators by a factor of 1.9-2.5.

The automated fire control system connects several command staff vehicles that are at the disposal of the commander, the unit chief of staff, and subunit commanders. Each of these vehicles, based on a KamAZ-4310 motor vehicle chassis, has an autonomous electrical power supply both while at a static position and while moving, a radio transceiver that provides communications in the VHF band to a range of up to 50 kilometers and in the HF band up to 350 kilometers.

It is sufficient to see a "SMERCH" salvo just one time to agree: That is really a tornado [smerch].

The SVD-S Sniper Rifle

92UM1342B Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 2 Feb 92 pp 93-94

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "The SVD-S Sniper Rifle"]

[Text] The sniper rifle that was a variation of the Mosin Model 1891/30 grain 7.62 mm magazine-fed rifle that was adapted for the installation of a sniper sight and which had certain other modifications that had little impact on grouping was in the Soviet Army inventory

right up until the 1960's. In 1958, work was begun on a model 1908/30 grain special sniper semi-automatic rifle with that same 7.62 cartridge (7.62 X 54).

They proposed combining in the rifle the fire maneuverability and simplicity of an ordinary semi-automatic weapon with the accuracy and grouping of special target models. It is no coincidence that the task was assigned to Sports Weapon Designer Ye.F. Dragunov. S.G. Simonov developed his SVS-128 model in parallel with him. After long testing, Dragunov's model was accepted into the inventory under the designation SVD (Dragunov Sniper Rifle) in 1963. The *modernized model SVD-S* was finally developed at the beginning of the 1990's (its technical data is set forth here and later in italics).

Layout and Operation

The SVD assault rifle operates using the exhaust of gunpowder gases through the side slit in the barrel wall. *An improved gas exhaust device has been installed on the SVD-S that increases the reliability of operation in difficult conditions. The gas regulator has been eliminated. The barrel is manufactured with thickened walls and its survivability and engagement stability during prolonged firing have been increased.* Locking and loading the cartridge is carried out by turning the breech and, in the process, three receiver lugs that are symmetrically located with regard to its axis, enter the grooves in the body.


The bolt-slide-piston assembly that absorbs the impact of gunpowder gases through the gas piston and gas piston rod serves as the assault rifle's main component. The gas piston rod and gas piston, as individual parts with their own recoil spring, are also returned to the forward position immediately after the bolt is thrown back. The retracting handle, located on the right, is manufactured together with the bolt-slide-piston assembly. The latter's recoil mechanism has two springs.

In the SVD-S, the body has been strengthened which has increased the mechanical durability of the item and has improved the stability of the optic sight mount.

It has a hammer-type trigger mechanism with a P-shaped hammer spring. The trigger mechanism assembly permits the conduct of just semiautomatic fire. It has a dual-action thumb safety: it simultaneously locks the trigger and restricts the movement of the bolt-slide-piston assembly back, while propping up the retracting handle. The full automatic sear assembly ensures that a shot occurs only when the bore is totally closed. The trigger mechanism is assembled in a separate housing.

A flash suppressor is attached to the muzzle end of the barrel. The SVD model is equipped with a wooden stock and the recess in it forms a pistol grip. *A folding stock with a non-retractable grip plate and a plastic shoulder support is installed on the SVD-S model.* The forestock assembly consists of two symmetrical handguards with notches for improved cooling of the barrel.

SVD Trigger Mechanism



Key:

1. Hammer spring
2. Slots for the connector pin
3. Hole for the hammer pin
4. Hole for the full automatic sear assembly pin
5. Hole for the sear pin
6. Hole for the safety pin
7. Hole for the trigger pin
8. Catch for the trigger spring
9. Opening for the trigger spring tail
10. Safety pin
11. Trigger spring
12. Trigger
13. Stop catch
14. Trigger bar
15. Pins
16. Sear Shank
17. Housing
18. Sear
19. Sear catch
20. Full automatic sear
21. Magazine catch
22. Full automatic sear assembly lever
23. Full automatic sear assembly
24. Full cock
25. Full automatic sear notch
26. Hammer.

The PSO-1 4-power telescopic sight with range scale was especially developed for the SVD. A luminescent screen that permits the detection of IR [infrared] radiation sources has been introduced into the telescopic design. The sight is equipped with range and direction adjustment mechanisms and with a cross hairs illuminating device. It also has an open ramp-type extended leaf sight with the sighting plate located in the center and the blade front sight at the muzzle end of the barrel.

V.M. Sabelnikov, P.F. Sazonov, and V.N. Dvoryaninov developed a 7.62 mm sniper round, the bullet of which

on the whole is similar in design to an ordinary bullet with a steel core but which ensures a better grouping, to fire from the sniper rifle.

Ten rounds in chess formation are in a square sector removable metal magazine. A standard bayonet can be fixed to the rifle for hand-to-hand combat.

By admission of many Soviet and foreign experts, special and "general" combat qualities have been successfully combined in the SVD. The rifle is in the inventories of the army of six other countries.

SPECIFICATIONS

Round—7.62 X 54 mm

Weight—3.7 kilograms (without the magazine and telescopic sight); 4.52 kg (with a loaded magazine and the PSO-1 sight); 4.9 kg with the bayonet.

Length—1,370 mm (with bayonet); 1,225 mm (without bayonet); 890 mm (with folding stock).

Barrel length—620 mm.

Grooves—4, spacing 240 mm.

Bullet muzzle velocity—830 meters per second.

Muzzle energy—3,307 joules.

Firing mode—semiautomatic.

Rate of fire—30 rounds per minute.

Maximum range—1,300 meters (with the telescopic sight); 1,200 meters (with the open sight).

Range of direct fire at a standing figure—640 meters.

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The Commander—Forward Air Controller—Helicopter Crew

92UM1342A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 pp 42-44

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor, Colonel M. Krivolutskiy, under the rubric: "School of Combat Proficiency": "The Commander—Forward Air Controller—Helicopter Crew (Coordination Issues)"]

[Text] Modern helicopter gunships are reliable allies and assistants of motorized riflemen, tank crewmen and airmobile assault troopers. They carry out difficult combat work in their interests: they suppress targets at fortified positions both on the forward edge of the battle area [FEBA] and also in the depth: They combat advancing reserves, first of all tank columns, destroy artillery, manpower and weaponry when they are deployed in the defense and when they are on the move. The success of their employment will largely be predetermined by the precision of the coordination between combined arms and helicopter subunits. Based on the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan and troop training, its organization first of all consisted of a timely request for aviation, target designation, and mutual recognition and identification.

As exercise experience indicates, it is in the resolution of these issues that commanders encounter the most difficulty. Carrying out tasks becomes more complicated for helicopter crewmen without assistance from the ground. First of all a dynamic, rapidly changing ground and air situation, a limited view of terrain during flight at very low altitudes substantially reduces the probability of

accurate detection of targets by the crew. And enemy employment of deceptive operations and false targets still further complicates their identification and at times results in gross errors and even conducting strikes against subunits of our own troops. That is why a forward air controller is designated to maintain continuous coordination of a motorized rifle (tank) battalion and helicopter gunships. Nonorganic forward air controllers from platoon commanders, officer artillery men or other individuals with communications equipment can be put into the field in companies, and sometimes in platoons, for direct target designation to crews during the final segment of vectoring and to adjust their fire.

It's indisputable that here you can't get by without special training, knowledge of combined arms subunit and army aviation tactics and their capabilities. Yes, and you can't rule out knowledge of the enemy and his air defense system.

A sortie led by Veteran Pilot V. Kononenko was supporting a motorized rifle battalion commanded by Major P. Ilyukhin. At one stage of the exercise during an engagement in the depth of the defense, battalion reconnaissance detected the "enemy" advancing in a column for a counterattack. The range to the target did not exceed the distance at which the artillery battalion attached to the subunit could reliably destroy it. But for some reason, after long thought, they assigned the task to a sortie of helicopter gunships that were on the staging site helipad. Forward Air Controller Major V. Mochalov rapidly disseminated the battalion commander's order to the crews. Nevertheless, some time had already passed before the rotary-winged aircraft appeared over the target. The "enemy" managed to deploy into an extended line and the aviators did not inflict much damage to him. And it turned out that way only because the battalion commander had an inadequately precise perception of the capabilities of army aviation and did not ascertain the opinion of the specialist who was nearby.

As a rule, a forward air controller is in the combat vehicle alongside the battalion KNP [Command and Observation Post]. A working map, binoculars (stereoscopic telescope), a watch, a flare pistol, a set of signal flares and air-ground panels, pyrotechnic flares, and a plotter with an azimuth ring and a compass attached to it and an R-855 type emergency radio—that is his equipment. He remains directly subordinate to the chief of the combat control group (GBU) and is subordinate to the combined arms commander while aviation is carrying out missions to support the subunit. Artillery observers are deployed at their target designation points (posts) that are equipped with surveillance, communications, and target designation systems. They are in constant contact with the forward air controller while resolving aviation combat operation command and control issues.

In order to more fully present the number of tasks assigned to the latter, let's review, by way of illustration,

the content and procedures of the forward air controller's work in defense. He begins to organize coordination jointly with the flying personnel from the helicopter gunship strike group. He studies the enemy formation and the nature of enemy operations and the terrain features in the defense area. He ascertains the call-signs of the combat control group, battalion command and observation post, and subunit and army aviation target designation points (posts), the password and the procedures for its use, and signals for mutual identification and for recognition and identification of the troops. He prepares his working map—he enters the encryption key, marks the primary reference points, etc.

During the preliminary reconnaissance conducted by the battalion commander, the forward air controller clarifies the concept of operations for the engagement, the fire plan, plots the situation on the map, coordinates the procedures for receiving data about the enemy and for conducting negotiations on technical systems with the chief of staff. He indicates the location of target designation points (posts) on the terrain and the availability of required systems and procedures of their employment for target designation and to recognize and identify their own troops. While considering the land and air situation in the defense area, terrain relief and weather conditions, they plan the procedures for the helicopter crews to access the targets and facilities being struck with the calculation of reducing to a minimum the time of their forced maneuvering in the holding area before the attack. Jointly with the battalion commander, the forward air controller determines the procedures for opening and conducting fire against enemy airborne targets by air defense and motorized rifle subunits. In so doing, they stipulate the methods and signals for identifying aircraft and helicopters and also for identifying and recognizing the positions of our own subunits. You should not count on the success of the engagement without the precise coordination of ground subunit and helicopter gunship operations against targets, lines, axes and time during the destruction of the enemy on the approaches to the defense, repelling attacks in front of the FEBA, and destruction while driving a wedge into fortified areas.

Maintenance of continuous coordination during the course of an engagement is the most important task of the combined arms commander, staff, forward air controller and helicopter crews. Rotary-winged aircraft can inflict strikes against targets that have been planned by the senior commander or when summoned by the battalion commander. And they are capable of operating in a different way: from the helipads of the primary base or staging site, while in an ambush, or from an alert status in the air or on the ground. Each individual situation has its own specific features.

So, the combat control group commander issues the order to the forward air controller to vector the helicopters to previously assigned targets. In so doing, they clarify the location and nature of the targets, the composition and combat formation of the helicopter group,

their mission and strike time, the route and altitude of flight, and the numbers of the primary reference points. Upon receipt of the combat mission, the forward air controller informs the battalion commander, precisely determines the position of the forward subunits and the targets against which they plan to conduct artillery shelling and its duration. The officer tells the target designation points (posts) and, if necessary the unit PVO [air defense] chief, about the helicopters' routes and flyover times.

The range to the target is determined with the naked eye using optical devices or by measuring on a map after tying in the target to the terrain by survey and the direction to it—using an azimuth circle. The officer enlists the radio operator and the combat vehicle driver for surveillance of the field of battle. Having detected the target and having determined the azimuth and distance to it, the forward air controller continues surveillance and is ready to immediately transmit information to the crews of the helicopter strike group.

He transmits the target designation to them over the radio in open text and repeats the former using the identification systems which, as a rule, the artillery and mortar subunits use. To do that, smoke, incendiary, and illuminating rounds (mortar rounds) are used and also bursts of other munitions. They indicate the direction to target using tracer bullets from small arms and the location by their intersection. They open fire to designate the target at the command of the battalion commander when the helicopters appear within visual range and they cease fire (for safety of flight considerations) based on the forward air controller's information. Signals of mutual recognition are issued simultaneously both from the helicopters and also from the target designation points (posts) of the subunits that are in the defense.

Let's review the coordination procedures in the event of the use of army aviation based on the battalion commander's summons. To do that, he compiles an urgent request based upon which the forward air controller submits a recommendation to headquarters about the advisability of an attack from the air against some target or other (while considering the combat capabilities of the helicopters and the restrictions of their employment). Then the content of the request is transmitted to the combat control group with an indication of the location of the target and the type and required number of aircraft. If the helicopters are in an ambush in the air or in the battalion defense area, the forward air controller independently issues the command for them to takeoff and vectors the crews to the enemy target.

While carrying out the request, the forward air controller controls the helicopter gunships detail for the attack and retargets them in accordance with changes of the situation or with changes to the battalion commander's decision. If necessary, he adjusts their fire while considering the course of the target run and weapons detonations. He also continuously informs the crews about

newly detected air defense weapons and the nature of their operations, and simultaneously provides target designation to the battalion's weaponry that have been attached to designate targets and to support the aircraft flight through the artillery observer.

If the pilots have not detected the target for whatever reasons, the officer attempts to prevent the helicopters from entering the enemy PVO weapons most effective zone of destruction. To do that, he issues the command to breakoff and descend to a very low altitude. Repeat guidance to the target of attack is carried out from a different direction. In the event of the use of jamming, the forward air controller shifts from radio conversations to target designation using target designation devices.

The results of helicopter gunship operations during air support of battalion subunits largely depend on the teamwork and coordination of the actions of the forward air controller, strike group crews and battalion subunits, from their understanding of the forward air controller's concept of operations to the accuracy and timeliness of information about the target, signals and commands.

In conclusion, let's point out that those who continuously maintain coordination in an engagement are capable of defeating even a stronger enemy. This truth has been known for as long as the military profession has existed. Experience confirms: you can only improve coordination of various types of men and equipment at joint drills and tactical exercises. The skill of commanders to act in a difficult situation that approximates combat, with a profound understanding of their place and role, and with knowledge of the combat capabilities of subunits of the opposing force is currently one of the factors of success.

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CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Dismantling of Nuclear Subs Would Imperil Severodvinsk Environment

92WN0689B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 28, 12-19 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by Lyudmila Zhukova, Severodvinsk: "We All Live Off a Yellow Submarine"—first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] The situation in Severodvinsk following a presidential visit there.

An excerpt from Severodvinsk mayor, V. Lyskov's memorandum for the Russian Federation government:

"There are over 50 nuclear reactors on board submarines berthed inside the city, with the aggregate amount of radioactive materials 20 times greater than that in the crippled unit of the Chernobyl NPP. Over 1,000 potentially dangerous nuclear-related jobs—including the replacement of nuclear fuel in the submarines' reactors

and putting the reactors in operation which creates a particularly precarious situation—are done within the city limits annually. Storage of eight decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines with still loaded nuclear cores poses another major problem. Some of the subs have been laid up here since 1975, which makes the probability of an accident rather high."

All the subs with missile sections cut out and nuclear cores already past the guaranteed safety age are in custody of the White Sea Naval Base and kept in store at the port which is next door to residential area. Commander of the Base, Rear Admiral Leonid Salnikov argues that the floating workshops' capacity is too low, but the subs cannot be relocated elsewhere, since only Severodvinsk has the adequate equipment and experts for work with such subs.

In the meantime, the Northern Fleet continues to store obsolete nuclear-powered subs earmarked for recycling. The city will soon receive strategic subs of the Delta-1, Delta-2, and Delta-3 classes built in 1973-79. If the city's powerful (and Russia's only) plant code-named Zvyozdochka (starlet) capable of repairing, re-equipping and modernizing nuclear-powered submarines of all classes embarks on mass-scale carving up and utilization of the scrapped subs, this will gravely imperil the environment. According to U.S. data, carving up of a single Yankee-class sub will be accompanied by discharge into the atmosphere of 45 kilograms of manganese and chromium oxides apart from cobalt and lead.

Severodvinsk is a major builder of subs. The country's supreme naval command has always considered commissioning of every new sub a priority. Between 1967 and 1972, the Navy received 24 missile-carrying submarine strategic cruisers of the Yankee class alone. All were built at the Severny (Northern) Machine-Building Plant, at an astounding rate, unknown even in the United States.

It's time to bring a stop to it. Construction of just one nuclear-powered sub now costs four billion roubles on average. But the admirals have grown accustomed to receiving ever new subs for their fleets. A greed for more and more toys is understandable in a five year-old child but not in statesmen.

Boris Yeltsin's visit to Severodvinsk this spring brought the focus of public attention to the problems of that city. It was decided to turn it into a national centre of nuclear-powered shipbuilding. The city was promised it would be relieved of all headaches hampering fulfillment of this ambitious plan. Nevertheless, the problems continue to pile up.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Role of Committee to Protect Interests of Servicemen

92UM1344A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Aug 92 First edition pp 1,2

[Article by Major Ivan Ivanyuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "They Come Here for Hope"]

[Text] A Special Committee Under the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense Is Supposed to Protect the Interests of Servicemen for the State.

There are always a lot of people in the pass office at 42 Shchepkina in Moscow, where the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen under Russia's Ministry of Defense is located. Here one can meet the head of a regional association of reserve servicemen, a new farmer, an officer's wife who has come to Moscow "for justice." Although the committee was set up only a few months ago, it is becoming what it is supposed to be, a center for defending the rights of those who have linked their lives with the armed forces.

Its role as an administrative agency of the state was enhanced by the signing of a decree of the Russian Federation's government on 21 July of this year.

"It is our job," committee chairman Aleksandr Temerko says, "to see that a single state policy is worked out and implemented in the area of social support for servicemen, including those in the reserve, and their families. The T/O calls for a staff of 180. As the saying goes, however, we shall conquer not with numbers but with skill...."

Despite the fact that the sections are not completely staffed, work is in full swing in them. One of the committee's key sections is the section for housing and living arrangements for servicemen. We know that the housing problem is most acute in the Russian army. As of 1 January 1990 there were 104,600 families without apartments.

"It is calculated," section chief Viktor Lyubimov says, "that another 112,700 will be added to this figure by the end of the year, mainly by the return of military units to Russia from abroad."

The figures are depressing, of course. There could be 20,000 fewer families without apartments in the army and navy if local authorities had allocated apartments in a timely manner under the well-known government decision and through housing construction on a shared basis with the Ministry of Defense. The indebtedness which is to be paid off in accordance with the 19 February 1992 decree of the president of Russia is being liquidated too slowly. The military have received only slightly more than a tenth of the apartments due them.

The committee's interaction with kray and oblast administrations has shown that there have been objective reasons for not settling the debts. The situation would have permitted more to be done in a number of areas, however. On the other hand, it has become clear that financial support is needed for the housing program in the army and navy. And decisions have been adopted to that effect. The president of Russia has signed the Decree on Additional Steps to Finance the Construction or Acquisition of Housing for Servicemen.

Viktor Lyubimov tells us that one of the main jobs of the committee, and of other structural subunits of the Ministry of Defense, right now is that of preparing government decrees on urgent measures to provide reserve servicemen with housing. The state's debt to them has grown even greater, but apartments have practically ceased to be allocated locally.

The problem today is not just one of getting the money for this purpose. Even the 39.3 billion rubles allocated will hardly eliminate all of the problems. Consider this factor. Since the beginning of the year the military construction workers have practically worked on credit, taking out loans at high interest rates. And these loans will have to be paid off....

A simple calculation will show that despite the decisive steps being taken, even if all the plans are fulfilled, the number of people without apartments in the army and navy will not drop but will actually increase by the beginning of next year. The Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen is therefore engaged in the study and implementation of possibilities for resolving the housing problem. Among other things, a fundamental decision has been adopted under which part of the credit granted to Russia by Spain will be used to resolve the social problems of servicemen. We are talking about an amount on the order of 80 million dollars. Some of it will go toward development of the construction industry, and specifically, for the purchase of brick plants. If we have the construction base, we shall have housing.

It is the job of the committee headed by A. Temerko to coordinate and acquire apartments for the military, for which purpose instructions from the president call for allocating special-purpose funds. This involves unplanned situations, of course, in which, let us say, the transfer of a military unit is not being effected according to the plan, and there is no time to build housing. Depending upon the specific circumstances, the Ministry of Defense will acquire individual apartments or entire buildings. The section which deals with housing problems is prepared to accept appropriate offers from organizations selling housing. The telephone numbers to call are 971-84-10 and 971-81-71.

I do not believe it would be an exaggeration to say that many officers and warrant officers are attracted to the possibility of building small houses for themselves. Clearly, on the scale of the armed forces, this can resolve the problem for only a few thousand families at best. The committee is giving close attention also to this option for providing social protection for servicemen, however. Alternatives involving participation by foreign companies in the construction of small private homes—the Austro-German Wolf-System, among others—are being worked out. While offers from Czechoslovakia were "left hanging," problems with credit developed there.

In general, the committee adheres to the principle that small private homes should be built only for those who

will settle down to manage and farm the land and make a contribution to the resolution of the food problem. This option is not economically justified otherwise.

The section for the retraining and job-placement of servicemen is headed by Aleksandr Kondrashov.

"The number of officers and warrant officers who would like to become farmers exceeds even the boldest expectations," Aleksandr Ivanovich says. "A survey conducted in the spring revealed 30,000, and there are even more now. Ninety out of approximately every 100 letters received by the section every day deal with this subject. There are perhaps more active farmers, 300, in Leningrad Oblast than anywhere else. Retired Col Aleksandr Shaforostov heads the association of peasants and farmers there. He himself has taken over 50 hectares of land and raises 300 steers. Officer families in Tula, Voronezh, Novgorod and Pskov oblasts are farming successfully. We have helped more than 70 officer families find jobs in rural areas and acquire their own homes.

Incidentally, Decree No. 460 On Measures to Help officers, Seagoing and Shore-Based Warrant Officers and Extended-Duty Personnel Released Into the Reserve Due to the Reduction of the Armed Forces to Set up Peasant Holdings (Farms) was passed on 2 July of this year. Among other things, it calls for the allocation of 1-1.5 billion rubles for this purpose this year. The Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen, together with state administrative agencies, has already started to help those who want to link their lives with the land. Permanent contacts with local administrative leaders are making it possible to resolve many issues to the benefit of the future farmers: land allotment, acquisition of loans and the provision of equipment and machinery. Military construction workers of Russia's Ministry of Defense and agencies engaged in the sale of technical military property which has served out its service life or been classified as excess are also joining in the establishment of farms.

The section in charge of job-placement actually acts as a middleman. And although the committee is only now receiving computers, it has built up and is continuing to build up a data bank on both jobs available and openings

for workers. Everyone who comes here receives competent advice or actual, specific help. This work is performed by reserve lieutenant colonels Yuriy Samsonov, Aleksey Gulenkov and Viktor Kolbasnikov, workers with a lot of experience who served many years in the Main Personnel Directorate. They are assisted by Lyudmila Mishina. It is primarily these people to whom those trying to find a place in the new, civilian life entrust their fate. Their assistance would unquestionably be far more effective if the officers and warrant officers who turn to the committee would not come simply with a desire "to be a farmer," but having studied the situation in the specific area and able to tell about the problems they have encountered.

There is a card file on more than 3,000 officers and warrant officers released into the reserve from March to July of this year for Moscow and Moscow Oblast alone. It is planned to establish such files for all of Russia in the immediate future based on the close ties being established with military commissariats. This will make it possible, among other things, to establish regional centers for the social adaptation of servicemen to civilian life, where problems of retraining and job-placement can be resolved and all kinds of other assistance and support can be provided. The statute on such a center has already been worked out. The committee recently sent a letter to the heads of administrations suggesting that they take an active part in this work. There are also plans to involve commercial structures actively in this work. They too have an interest in an influx of fresh forces.

I would like to believe that these comments will evoke a feeling of optimism and confidence in the future in our newspaper's readers, and in the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense is directly at work on their social problems. Perhaps someone will discover an address to which he can go for help and support. The Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen is expanding the scope of its work to cover a broader range of tasks. And perhaps it would be worthwhile right now to begin thinking about extending the influence of this needed structure to apply not just to servicemen of the Ministry of Defense, but to all people wearing a uniform, regardless of where they serve: in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MB [Ministry of Security?] or the railway troops. Their problems are identical. So that they would not be competing among themselves for benefits and privileges, as is sometimes the case today, but would conduct a unified social policy at the state level.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Future Russian Use of Crimean Medical Facilities

92UM1313A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 92 First edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel-General Medical Service E. Nechayev, chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, by Mikhail Lukanin: "The Resort Season: The First Time Without Crimea?"]

[Text]

[Lukanin] Eduard Aleksandrovich [Nechayev], it is still hard to believe that the dividing of the Armed Forces has not bypassed the military resorts. Please explain to us whether now the Russian servicemen will be able to visit the famous Crimean resorts?

[Nechayev] The military sanatoriums and vacation homes located on Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as of now are under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. As of 1 July, trip passes are not being issued to the Russian servicemen for visiting there. What has happened is this. They have not refused to issue us the trips. But the prices! The Crimean sanatoriums have now become terribly expensive. From 10,000 to 14,000 for one trip. And what about if the entire family goes as is usually the case. You will agree that such expenses are simply beyond the pocketbook of a Russian officer. It is a pity, a great pity, but the prices set by the Ukrainian side for the trips have actually cut us off from the Crimean military resorts.

This, of course, is a tangible loss all the more as Crimea was always considered an all-Union resort and a majority of the sanatoriums here such as Krym [Crimea], Gurzufskiy, Sakskiy, Feodosiyskiy, Alupkinskiy and the children's Yevpatoriyskiy and Mayak had the status of central institutions and priority attention was given to their development.

As a total, 29 military sanatoriums and vacation homes with a total capacity of 15,400 places were turned over to Ukraine. Some 36 resorts capable of handling 14,500 persons simultaneously have remained as the property of the Russian Armed Forces. That is the reality of things.

[Lukanin] How are we going to adjust to all this?

[Nechayev] In the first place, although, as we have already said, we do not like the prices for the trips to the Ukrainian sanatoriums, we shall nevertheless send for treatment in Yevpatoriya a certain number of children, in truth though, less than in previous years. We shall also endeavor to do everything possible so that tuberculosis patients and persons who have sustained major injuries as before can go to the Crimean resorts for treatment. There is nothing else to be done as it takes time so set up our own sanatorium and resort facilities of an analogous sort.

Secondly, it cannot be said that we are back to where we started. The situation with the military resort for the Russians, although somewhat worse, is still not hopeless. The military sanatoriums and vacation houses have been well prepared for the summer season in the regions of the Greater Moscow Area, Kavkazskiy Mineralnyye Vody, the Karelian Isthmus, the Transbaykal and the Far East. The loss of the sanatorium facilities in Crimea to some degree can be compensated for by our resorts in the Gelendzhik and Sochi Resort Areas. In order to increase the number of vacations in the Russian military sanatoriums and vacation homes, we have somewhat shortened the length of the stay there by two-four days. As a result, it has become possible to provide an additional nearly 25,000 trips.

[Lukanin] Eduard Aleksandrovich, in the current economic situation it clearly would be hard to speak about the building of new facilities and an in any-way substantial expansion of the current sanatorium and resort facilities. I have in mind the foreseeable future.

[Nechayev] Let us not be pessimists. Military medicine in Russia has not been forgotten even in our times of crisis. Moreover, according to the direct instructions of the Russian minister of defense, a clear stage-by-stage program has already been worked out for the development of the military resorts.

First of all we plan to complete the construction of the already commenced treatment and vacation facilities and this will provide us just over the next few years with a total increase of 3,000 places in such sanatoriums as Arkhangelskoye, Sochinskiy, Svetlogorskiy, Yessentukskiy, Divnomorskoye, Avrora, Volga and others.

Over the next five-seven years, we plan to complete 17 sanatorium and resort facilities which are to be set up on the basis of the sanatoriums of the Zvenigorodskoye, Kislovodskoye, Pyatigorskoye, Chebarkulskoye, Molokovskoye, Kuldurskoye, Paratuyka and Yeltsovka facilities as well as the Mozhayskiy and Betta vacation homes.

Particular importance is being given to the question of setting up new resorts on the Black Sea Coast of the Caucasus. This region could and should become an alternative to Crimea. In particular, we plan to build here several military sanatoriums and, what is of fundamental importance, an all-Army children's treatment and rehabilitation center in Anapa and which will include a clinical sanatorium, a boarding facility and summer camps.

Finally, we have tourist facilities in regions with exceptionally good resort and climatic factors. Individual ones (Pyatigorsk, Krasnaya Polyana, Kudépsta, Sochi and others) can be turned into modern health facilities which combine sanatorium treatment and tourist leisure. That is, we want to work out a unified system of sanatorium—vacation home—tourist facilities. Let us say, you are young and full of energy and you prefer active leisure but here as well you would like to receive certain treatments during the leave. As you wish, at the tourist

facility you can be put under medical observation. And just how rare is it for the sanatoriums to receive virtually healthy persons merely because a "hot" trip has come their way? Here we shall have broader opportunities for maneuvering in sending the servicemen to the resorts.

[Lukanin] Let us go back to the prices for the trips. It is clear that for the Crimean sanatoriums they are for the millionaires. What what are our Russian prices now?

[Nechayev] The cost of a trip to the Russian military sanatoriums at present is from 2,900 to 3,200 rubles and to a vacation home 1,900-2,000 rubles. All the previous benefits for paying for the trips have been kept for the servicemen. As you can see, although the prices have gone up, using the current standard they must be judged as rather moderate. Particularly if it is considered that just the expenditures on food in the resorts at the given moment are 87 rubles per day per person. Believe me, it was not easy to keep such a price level. However the Russian Ministry of Defense firmly defends the position that no market forces should be permitted to shift into the background the concern for the health of the servicemen and the members of their families.

[Lukanin] Eduard Aleksandrovich, a last question. I realize that the "surprises" of the current year have put all of us Russians in a very difficult situation in terms of the resorts. What is your forecast: as of what date will the scarcity of trips finally begin to decline? Will we survive until then?

[Nechayev] If our program for the development of the Russian military resorts, as we mentioned it here, is carried out, the capacity of the sanatoriums and vacation homes will almost treble in comparison with the current period.

I feel that the problem can also be substantially mitigated by the following innovation incorporated in the draft Law On the Status and Social Guarantees of Servicemen, that is, the annual payment to the servicemen of monetary compensation amounting to the average cost of the trips. This "health" money can be spent by each man as he wishes, proceeding from his own personal plans for vacation.

Actually, as for the answer to your question. Our "bright tomorrow" is not so distant. But in the meanwhile things are difficult.

Troops in Estonia Still 'Showing Restraint'
*PM0308151192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 1*

[Valeriy Gromak and Vladimir Yermolin report: "Russian Seamen Being Shot At in Estonia. Protests Have Been Lodged. What Next?"]

[Text] Obeying an order by [Estonian] Deputy Defense Minister Toomas Puur [name as transliterated], 30 servicemen armed with assault rifles and led by Elmar Reyn

[name as transliterated], chief of the Estonian Republic Territorial Protection Department Rear Services, raided the compound of No. 328 Administration for Scheduled Construction Work (a military construction organization of the Baltic Fleet) 27 July and seized one of the unit's buildings. Administration Chief Colonel Yuriy Temnikov was taken hostage and civilian employees were led out into the street. Paperwork and furniture were thrown out of the window... Temnikov managed to report the event to Tallinn Naval Base Headquarters. By order of the fleet commander, a subdivision led by Captain First Rank Vyachelsav Gay, acting chief of staff of the Tallinn Naval Base, was sent to the assistance of the military construction workers. Upon seeing the Russian seamen, the Estonians opened fire. Captain 1st Rank Gay and Yuriy Kalashnikov, one of the civilian employees, were wounded. By 1530 hours, the unit's compound was cleared: 24 Estonians were taken prisoner, the remaining six fled. The assailants' weapons were confiscated. Two hours after negotiations with the Estonian side, the prisoners were released.

Thus, another incident. And once again in Estonia. Let us remind readers that on 5 July a "Kaitseliit" division carried out an armed attack on a military installation in the village of Risti. Servicemen's personal belongings were pillaged and five specialized vehicles were stolen. On 10 July in the very same region, three military unit vehicles were fired upon. A train carrying ammunition was hijacked at Tartu railroad station 18 July. The Estonian side's trophy comprised roughly 50,000 fixed-round cartridges and 300,000 small-arm cartridges. There were a total of 10 cases of unlawful action against Russian servicemen in May-July.

The well-known story about the attacking side's not being deterred by difference in weight categories springs to mind. The Estonian Republic must appear to be strong, seeing that it prefers talks from a position of strength out of all the forms of communication with Russia. Thus a few hundred real men have already been found, openly swearing that under the banner of the "Kaitseliit" they will "continue armed resistance against the occupying forces" and will not cease the struggle "until the last occupying soldier and his minions have left the Estonian Republic's territory." And, indeed, why not flex your muscles a bit and go down in history as a patriot-liberator if you know very well that in general there is no threat to you personally. The "native" government also relates to such patriotism with understanding, and as for the Russian soldiers, it will be a long time before they regain all the former confidence of soldiers belonging to a "great power."

Alas, the impudence and aggressiveness of advocates of tough negotiations with Russia can in no way be attributed to Estonia's state and military might, but rather to the deficiencies of Russian statehood. It is abundantly clear to see in nearby foreign parts how forces connected with the authorities sometimes concentrate not on strengthening statehood but on clarifying relations

among their own ranks. People over there have accurately perceived that if the Russian Supreme Soviet adopts a resolution—sharp in both form and content—on human rights violations in Estonia, this does not mean that the president and the government intend to act in the very same spirit. Furthermore, people over there hope with some justification for a political brawl among Russia's social forces, which—democratically or undemocratically—are urging not to turn the other cheek when the first has been struck. There is also some reliance upon support from the West, whose opinion has acquired in other cases the importance of nothing less than a command for the Eastern neighbor. And if the West forgives "little Estonia" for something it has done, you can be sure that the remnants of a recent superpower will not be forgiven for doing the same thing.

No, it would be unfair to ignore the efforts by the Russian Defense Ministry, resolutely protesting any illegal actions, wherever they may occur, against Russian troops. But the Estonian Government could not care less about all these protests and declarations. Judging from the real state of affairs, they are just hot air. And given the latest incident, even the Russian-Estonian agreements which have been concluded do not constitute a guideline for action for Estonia, but rather a rough copy which can be corrected at its discretion.

Unfortunately, the development of permanent conflict around the Russian troops in Estonia is moving along the same path taken by other "volatile" republics: Each incident of armed attack upon a military unit or serviceman gets a one-sided interpretation in the local press, the essence of which is that the military are to blame. And those shot at point blank range, as in Armenia, can also, it seems, be accused of every deadly sin. And as a result—impunity. In any case, no legal proceedings have been initiated in any of the former Union republics against the criminals who have raised their hands against servicemen, or those who have stormed military units and stolen military hardware, or pillaged arsenals—be it in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Chechnya, or Georgia... It is unlikely that justice will be done as regards the raiders of military units in Estonia, either.

Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral V. Yegorov noted recently in a conversation with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The situation in Estonia now is extremely difficult for us... Attacks on servicemen are fraught with grave consequences. It will all begin with one shot. But we are showing restraint for the time being." Russian seamen showed restraint on this occasion too: By contrast with the Estonian servicemen, the Russians did not open fire.

UKRAINE

Chief of Main Staff Sobkov Discusses Summer Training

92UM1315A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Armed Forces Chief of Main Staff Lieutenant-General Vasilii Sobkov: "Ukrainian Armed

Forces Chief of Main Staff Lieutenant-General Vasilii Sobkov: Carry Out Combat Training Tasks in the Summer Training Period in an Organized Manner and With High Quality"]

[Text] The summer training period that is beginning is characterized by a number of specific features which our Armed Forces and the state as a whole are experiencing at the present time. They are the difficult economic situation, the first draft and manning of the Armed Forces only with Ukrainian citizens, and the continuing process of the reform of the Armed Forces themselves. While proceeding from these specific features, an analysis of the country's socio-economic development, the military-political situation, and the availability of material-technical resources, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense has defined the primary task of the summer training period as **preventing a reduction of troop combat readiness and combat capability, cohesion and combat teamwork training of newly created military collectives, establishing strict military discipline and law and order in them, and organizing and conducting a planned and continuous process of troop training.**

Just what do we need to do so that the main task of the summer training period is successfully carried out?

First of all, we need to begin summer training in an organized manner with the conduct of combat readiness exercises in which each serviceman of a subunit and division-sized or smaller units must completely study and master his functional duties while bringing the unit to various levels of combat readiness and headquarters—for command and control of them. Continue to improve the knowledge and skills acquired during the course of the entire summer training period.

We must devote special attention to working out teamwork and coordination of newly formed (reformed) command and control organs. We must plan steps for their training and carry them out while proceeding from the operational and combat designation and the level of training of officers and warrant officers. The subject matter of headquarters training and command-staff exercises must ensure the consistency of staff training to carry out tasks based on their function.

It is advisable to set aside one third of headquarters training to work out issues of organizing and planning an engagement and to improve the command and control skills of units and subunits and also the issues of fire direction in the remaining time.

Experience indicates that the qualitative solution of issues of combat training is directly dependent on the knowledge level and teaching methods skills of the officers. Therefore, the increase of exactingness toward personnel training of each officer, general and admiral and the stimulation of their interest in the continuous improvement of their professional proficiency is the main thing.

Independent work on individual plans with effective assistance and monitoring by senior commanders must become the primary form of training in the commanders training system. Practice exercises and training to master their own functional duties must be the primary training method.

There are a large number of officers in the troops who are in unauthorized positions or under orders. We must also not forget about them and we must organize with them training in combined interim subunits based on developed programs.

Exercises in combat vehicles with the expenditure of vehicle resources were reduced during the winter training period as a result of the drastic restrictions on POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] and other material-technical resources. It would seem that an increase of tank gunnery and gunnery training at firing ranges, training on firing and fire control at gunnery training simulation ranges, and exercises in simulator classrooms on driving should have occurred. But that did not occur and the existing training facilities were not fully utilized.

Strict economizing of POL materials will also remain in the summer training period and therefore we need to utilize simulators and other training and technical systems, fighting vehicle gunnery training facilities and gunnery training simulation ranges with greater intensity in fire preparation and during driver training and recall the forgotten "walking through tank (vehicle) movements" training method.

Conduct firing drills no less than 3-4 times per week, one of them at night. Organize company fire control exercises on a tactical field not less than once per month and prior to company and battalion tactical exercises. Conduct graded firing training with each company for a month at which the issues of fire control will be verified.

We must place battalion (artillery battalion) field exercises and subunit (unit) exercises on training ranges at the foundation of troop field training. While conducting field exercises, concentrate special attention on working out issues of tactical and weapons training, driving combat vehicles and special training topics. The primary forms of exercises must be: battle drills, in combination with ZOMP [defense against weapons of mass destruction] drills, engineer, technical, special training and other training topics; execution, graded firing exercises of standard rounds from tanks and BMP's [armored personnel vehicles], small arms, and graded and performance-graded combat vehicle driving exercises. This organization of field exercises on the eve of battalion tactical training ensures purposeful training while considering the content of the topics of impending exercises.

Humanitarian training is called upon to provide a pleasant socio-psychological and morale atmosphere in the troops. Humanitarian training's basic tasks are the formation among all servicemen of a humane world view, a profound conviction in the regularity of the historical processes of the creation of an independent Ukrainian state and the psychological readiness with a weapon in hand to defend the freedom and independence of its people. Organize humanitarian training and conduct it in accordance with the theme plans that have been developed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Socio-Psychological Directorate, and while considering the specific features of performance of duty, the tasks carried out by the unit or subunit, and depending on the level of general and professional training of personnel.

The task of rooting out violations of discipline in Ukrainian Armed Forces military collectives is one of the important and primary tasks of commanders and senior commanders of all levels. We can carry it out only by cultivating in all servicemen, regardless of ethnic origin, a love for Ukraine, its holy places, and pride that they are serving in the army of a sovereign and independent state and a profound understanding that only a cohesive military collective is capable of successfully carrying out tasks for the defense of the Homeland.

Decisively conduct a struggle with any, even the most insignificant, manifestations of derision and harassment in military collectives, do not hide them, and strictly call to account the guilty, right up to filing criminal charges against them.

In the summer training period, we need to prevent cases of the death of personnel and reduce cases of trauma to a minimum in all aspects of military activity. To do this, not a single measure, be it combat training or the execution of economic work, should begin without instruction on safety regulations, and verification of the serviceability of vehicles and other equipment.

The troops must rid themselves of preconditions for road-transport and flying accidents and accidents on ships. To do this, commanders of all levels must analyze incidents which have previously occurred, establish the causes, and conduct painstaking work with personnel to fundamentally improve pre-trip, preflight, and pre-march preparation.

The practice of training troops is in constant change and development. Therefore, its constant improvement and the increase of its effectiveness is one of the main tasks of commanders and staffs of all levels. The art of leading depends on well thought-out planning, the level of training of commanders, and the continuous monitoring and effective introduction of the leading experience and practice of troop training. The fulfillment of all of the listed requirements will permit us to successfully carry out the tasks in the summer training period.

Kozhin Takes Loyalty Oath*92UM1275B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by Ukrinform Correspondent Mikhail Stetsyuk, Sevastopol: "The Commander of the Ukrainian Navy Has Taken the Oath"]

[Text] Sevastopol. Last Sunday, it was crowded and festive at the former school for warrant officers where the organizing group for creating the Ukrainian Navy is located. A solemn oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people was taken here. Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear-Admiral Boris Kozhin was the first to begin reading the text of the oath.

Compulsory service military personnel from the security and maintenance subunits of the future Ukrainian Naval Headquarters took the oath together with the organizing group officers. Well-wishers in attendance were army and navy veterans, relatives of the servicemen and "Afghan" vets. Although the gates of the KPP [entry control point] were open to all who wished to be there on that day, it turned out that there were no official representatives from the city government or from the Black Sea Fleet command authorities among the guests.

Black Sea Crews Take Oath*92UM1275C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by an unidentified NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "'Signalshchik' Is Part of the Ukrainian Navy"]

[Text] Black Sea Fleet Crimean Naval Base 68th Water Area Defense Brigade personnel and Signalshchik Ocean Minesweeper personnel voluntarily took the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people in a solemn atmosphere on 28 June 1992. The Ukrainian State Flag was raised on the ship. The crew's declaration stated the readiness of the multiethnic personnel to serve in the Ukrainian Navy.

In accordance with the laws "On Defense of Ukraine" and "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces", the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Decree "On Military Formations in Ukraine", the Ukrainian President's Decree "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces" and based on the desires of Signalshchik Ocean Minesweeper personnel, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov issued an order which states:

1. The Black Sea Fleet Crimean Naval Base 68th Harbor Defense Brigade Signalshchik Ocean Minesweeper is part of the Ukrainian Navy.

2. Signalshchik Ocean Minesweeper's entire crew is entered into service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and will be granted all allowances.

3. The Black Sea Fleet commander's orders and directions which concern the removal of ship's personnel from carrying out their official duties are recognized as null and void since they are not in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Agreement between the Commonwealth member-states.

4. Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear-Admiral B.B. Kozhin will organize combat command and control, coordination and all forms of ship support.

Officer Union Called on to Deal With 'Social' Problems of Servicemen*92UM1273F Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Jun 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Yuriy Krut, candidate of military sciences, senior scientific associate, member of the Coordinating Council for the System of Higher Education and Science of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, under the rubric "Thinking Aloud": "The SOU Has Declared, But That Is Not Enough"]

[Text] As we know, a plenum of the executive committee of the Ukrainian Officers' Union was held on 6 June. Most of the chairmen of SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] organizations within Ukraine and many regional organizations outside Ukraine attended. Among those addressing the plenum were Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, Major-General Aleksandr Ignatyev, deputy personnel chief and chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Major-General Yuriy Prokofyev, chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

All of those present were united by their concern over the difficult economic and political situation in Ukraine, the increasing crime rate among servicemen and the deteriorating combat training level of the troops. Many of those who spoke talked about the need to return Ukrainian servicemen to Ukraine. This issue was one of the main topics during the discussion.

According to Colonel G. Omelchenko, chairman of the SOU executive committee, more than 300,000 officers and warrant officers are presently serving outside Ukraine. According to rough estimates the return of them and their families will involve almost half a million people. More than 6,000 of these servicemen are at hot spots right now and fighting for the cause of others. They should be brought back first. Unfortunately, the speakers could not say specifically who should provide the actual solution to this problem, which basically involves the provision of housing and jobs, or how it should be done.

The minister of defense and his deputy for personnel stated that the departments under their command are channelling all of the money earned through the commercial center into housing construction. Unfortunately, these funds are only a drop in the bucket.

The position of the higher military command in this matter evokes respect. But one wonders where our government stands. It is our government which should take care of the military, after all. Incidentally, the minister of defense has other, more important problems than those involving apartments. And the government will probably not take on their resolution either. Why, for example, is the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine forced to take on the problems of providing housing for servicemen? Could the answer to this question be contained in the address by Senior Lieutenant A. Melenin, one of the SOU deputy chairmen? "The government and the parliament have no need for us. To them our problems are just a background for their fight for seats, and as they win their seats they forget about us. Do the politicians really believe that the SOU will come to the aid of the bankrupt parliament?"

Here is something else which has caught our attention. It is not just the politicians, it turns out, who are disguising their true interests behind the social problems of the military. Major V. Yevsikov's address at the plenum would appear to be imbued with concern for the return of the officers. He proposed that the training combine for training junior specialists for the construction battalion be converted into a center for retraining officers and warrant officers released into the reserve as bricklayers, sanitary engineers and similar specialists. From the standpoint of the writer, this idea deserves attention. For understandable reasons, those present did not warm to it, however. After all, almost all of the officers slated for release have a higher education and experience in organizational or technical work. Foreign experts say that the state must retrain these people to meet the needs of industry and the supply system for mid-level specialists.

It was also disappointing that the idea of adaptation for discharged officers was not adequately reflected in the report by the chief of the directorate of VUZs. And the schools involved in the reduction could provide the foundation for setting up centers for retraining those released into the reserve.

The speakers brought up many social problems. It is just not clear who is to study and summarize them and bring them before the government or before those organizations responsible for resolving them. Previously we had Colonel V. Martirosyan, who spoke persistently about the problems of the servicemen. Now General Martirosyan heads the State Committee for Social Protection, which is a government organization with corresponding subordination and bureaucratic restrictions. It distributes those crumbs which the government gives us.

As a government organization this committee cannot have the power of a public organization, and this means that it cannot bring the social problems of servicemen before the Cabinet of Ministers, as the Ukrainian Officers' Union is in a position to do.

I feel that the absence of public agencies for resolving social problems is now being reflected in the acute

dissatisfaction of those who bring their problems to the Committee for Social Protection. The establishment of this committee at the initiative of the Officers' Union and the assignment to it of all functions in the area of defending the interests of servicemen and their families has obviously not solved the problem. I am firmly convinced that social issues must be raised and their resolution monitored by the public organization SOU, the objectives and the tasks of which declare this. But where in the organization can people go for help right now? Are there people in the Ukrainian Officers' Union who are supposed to focus on social problems? But then all issued resolved in the SOU have a social aspect. Matters of social protection for servicemen and their families are inseparable.

Take, for example, the return of Ukrainian officers to Ukraine, a matter which has drawn a lot of attention of late. We know that, with the rare exception, all of them will have to be provided with housing. And although most of them say in their requests that they have a place to live, they usually mean relatives, with whom they will have to live at first. Indeed, does the Ministry of Defense have empty apartments just waiting for these new arrivals? If it did, they would be occupied immediately by officers who, since 1986, for example, have moved from place to place in Kiev waiting for their own apartments. If the housing problem is not worked out right now, the new military arrivals will live with relatives for a while, then look for those responsible for transferring them and say: "You tore us away from where we lived. Now provide us with housing. Take care of us and our families." And they will be right.

There are two possibilities: not to bring the servicemen back or seriously to prepare for their return. There can be no doubt that they should be invited back. The officers are a treasure for any state. But thorough preparations must be made for their return.

Among those who could return to Ukraine are valuable scientific cadres. Their return may entail the return of scientific treasures to the homeland. But the arrival of those scientists can only be effected by providing social support for their families.

This is why the question of who should be entrusted with bringing social problems before the government and monitoring their resolution arises. Unfortunately, existing and past structures could not assure this. If they could, we would not have so many without apartments or housing assigned to people out of turn with impunity. Obviously, only the SOU, as a public organization, can monitor the use of dormitories vacated by the foreign students who previously occupied them. Quarters in them are presently being assigned without considering those without apartments. They are being filled with lieutenants, the darling sons of someone. Some workers with the Ministry of Defense just arrived in Kiev are behaving capriciously, changing apartments for more comfortable ones. In the meantime the waiting lists include senior officers, even those with academic degrees

and expertise, who have moved from one private apartment to another for many years.

It is time to restore social justice. And there is hope that the Ukrainian Officers' Union can do that.

But is housing actually the only problem we have? It is followed by others: finding jobs for those released, changing the amount and the structure of our pay and allowances, and others. All of these problems need to be studied and systematized by the public organization, communicating with the public, and then brought before the government.

The SOU therefore absolutely must set up its own group and establish the position of deputy chairman for social issues, who would report on his work to each plenum. Otherwise, social issues will continue to be only a point in the program of the Ukrainian Officers' Union.

Odessa MD Opens New Housing for Servicemen

*92UM1273E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by Major Nikolay Yagodin under the rubric "The Odessa Military District": "257 Apartments Released for Occupancy"]

[Text] Many servicemen are concerned about the situation which has developed in housing construction today. Rumors are going around that the construction of housing will soon stop entirely, for example, and the constructions battalions will be demobilized.

In order to reassure the readers let us turn to a qualified individual, Colonel S. Grudzev, deputy commander for construction and billeting of the Odessa Military District, and hear what he thinks about the matter.

The construction plan for the first five months was fulfilled in the district. So the situation is not so bad, as you can see. A total of 257 apartments were released ready for occupancy: an 80-unit building in Odessa, a 60-unit building in Raukhovka, a 40-unit building in Sovetskiy and 64 apartments at Shirokoe Lono. The present rates of construction permit us to make optimistic forecasts. By the end of the year another 310 apartments will have been completed in Odessa. That is not many, of course, but, unfortunately, the construction financing plan cannot be altered.

It is a significant fact that while civilian organizations fulfill construction plans by only 40-50% at best, the military organizations achieve 100% or more, although the quality frequently does not measure up to life's demands.

The approach taken to the resolution of problems pertaining to the provision of servicemen with housing has also been changed recently. While previously we spent 30-40% of total investments on housing, as of 1993 the figure will grow to 75-80%.

I therefore believe that the severity of the problem will have disappeared in two-three years.

The reader would probably like to know how many apartments it is planned to build next year, in 1993. Here are a few figures.

In all it is planned to release for occupancy 2,355 apartments, including 720 in Odessa, compared with 590 in 1992, 360 in Nikolayev, 316 in Zaporozhye, 231 in Belgorod-Dniestrovsk, 210 in Simferopol, 72 in Kherson and 105 in Feodosiya.

Almost all of the preparations for construction have been made in all these cities. Land plots have been allocated for the next three-five years, contracts for delivery of components and processed materials have been concluded, those responsible for the designing and construction have been designated, the provision of workers, machinery and transport equipment has been arranged, and so forth.

The housing program up to 1993 calls for the construction of 14,300 apartments by the military construction workers, plus an additional 2,000 with shared construction.

There are presently 10,014 servicemen on the roster of those needing housing, but we should not forget about the officers returning to Ukraine from hot spots in the CIS. Roughly 6,000-7,000 of them will arrive in Odessa Oblast alone.

A state housing construction program with active participation by the local soviets is therefore essential. The assistance provided by local authorities is adequate right now, however. The local soviets owe us 254 apartments in Odessa (323 in the oblast), for example, 52 in Feodosiya and 32 in Belgorod-Dniestrovsk—886 apartments in all for the district.

The severity of the housing shortage makes it essential properly to distribute what is built. The apartment distribution plan is not approved by the district commander until it has been reviewed by the housing commission and the Officers' Assembly and coordinated with the garrison KECh [billeting unit] and the garrison chief. It goes without saying that the housing commission must be made up of the most principled and honest people. That is very important, as you can understand.

Passage of Laws Seen as No Help to Servicemen's Plight

*92UM1273D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Jul 92 p 4*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dubinskiy, Major N. Nikolenko and Senior Lieutenant (Res) Ye. Drabkov, members of the Foundation for the Intellectual Property of Servicemen, under the rubric "The Reader's Point of View": "The Law Was Passed, but the Problems Remain"]

[Text] We were forced to write to the newspaper by a situation which arose during a meeting between V.V. Durdinets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, and the secretaries of oblast state administrations.

The latter complained of a shortage of experienced cadres in local representative bodies. Some of them cannot be accepted because they have sunk into corruption. Others are unsuitable with respect to professional and moral qualities and performance.

The strange thing was that right next to the auditorium in which the president's representatives were meeting, there were officers who had been released into the reserve and were completing social adaptation courses. Do these people, with their vast experience in organizational and indoctrinational work and their higher education, not possess the qualities necessary for making up the representative structures?

In the Ministry of Labor and Employment, however, one sees them working only in the capacity of plumbers and the like. This is how they try to fill vacancies. The youth are not rushing to enroll in the PTU [vocational and technical school]. It is more profitable to sell books, engage in profiteering and the like.

Many of those in charge of state establishments complain of a shortage of people capable of working selflessly without regard for the amount of time required.

When we recommend our colleagues for jobs in these structures, however, we do not encounter like-mindedness. The courses turn out production and personnel managers, and specialists in auditing, book-keeping and public communication. We also need to consider the fact that the students in these courses are officers with good basic preparation.

Can we really afford to overlook the practical know-how of specialists who know a foreign language or two, instructors, legal experts, programmers, electronics specialists, construction workers?

The bottom line is that we cannot live for today. We are all amazed to see intelligent people leaving the Ukraine. Is it truly advantageous to the government to have passed laws governing travel abroad only to have highly trained specialists from among the reserve officers and warrant officers leave their native land forever or for some time?

Right now all sorts of committees, foundations and unions are springing up like mushrooms after a rain. They are set up to handle or are attempting to handle problems pertaining to social protection for officers and warrant officers. Against whom, one asks, do the protectors of the homeland need to be protected? These are mainly young, healthy, capable and experienced military specialists. And then the officers and warrant officers themselves are expecting someone to protect them.

They therefore turn to these numerous protective bodies (mostly without results), failing to understand that in the situation of an almost destroyed economy the government will not have the funds to finance social protection programs for a long time to come.

Yes, there will be discharges of officers and warrant officers from the army, reductions, the demobilization of a large number of formations, units and VUZs. What are they to do, stand in line for goods and services? Stage demonstrations? Strike?

No, there are alternatives which can resolve the problems of those discharged without resorting to extreme acts. Right now, for example, associations of reserve officers and warrant officers are being formed and have set out on a path of resolving their own problems. Even the officers in the social adaptation courses have banded together into an organization and set up the intellectual property foundation. Its main job is to resolve problems of social adaptation for members of the foundation, to help them enter retraining courses and find jobs, to provide them with housing, to organize their own affairs and provide them with independent pensions and insurance.

What is troubling the officers today? The main thing is that the laws which have been enacted on social and legal protection for servicemen and their families are defective or are not being implemented at the local level.

The Law of Ukraine on the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, for example, does not specify the obligations of state agencies with respect to the rights of servicemen set forth in them.

Another, the Law on Pensions for Servicemen... does not take into account the needs of those who are being released as a result of the demobilization but have served less than 20 years.

A careful look at the wording of other laws of the Ukraine which define the rights of regular servicemen and those being released into the reserve confirm the above statement that they are defective (all laws on privatization, on taxes and entrepreneurial activities). And the number of servicemen released into the reserve will increase significantly by the end of the year. If we do not take this into account today, problems may arise in the military collectives and among the reserve officers and warrant officers.

There have already been numerous cases in which flaws in the laws have resulted in discrimination against servicemen. Individual workers in the executive agencies hamper the practical exercise of the rights of reserve officers and warrant officers to engage in entrepreneurial activities and form public organizations, do not allocate plots of land for individual construction and do not provide servicemen and reservists with housing.

Particularly troubling is the negative attitude of a number of managers of enterprises, kolkhozes and establishments and individual members of labor collectives toward the rights of servicemen to own a portion of state property after they have acquired the privatization documents required under the law.

What is more, there is nothing which defines the rights of servicemen with respect to the property of the demobilized units, installations, bases and military educational institutions. Would it not be better not to sell the real estate, machinery and other equipment of military posts at their residual value but to allow the servicemen themselves to lease it to set up small repair, repair and restoration and other enterprises? The money earned could be used to build the housing which is in such short supply for the families of servicemen. In addition, many other employment problems would solve themselves.

Nor is it necessary to sell the military machinery. There are many resourceful people who could set up entire enterprises to service commercial and other structures for transporting freight by air and motor transport, including harvesting operations.

There are numerous other alternatives for making more productive use of military property and machinery for the good of the servicemen. We believe that their practical implementation would greatly reduce sociopsychological tensions among those being released from the service.

We therefore propose that the regular and reserve officers think jointly about their future and give up their expectation of "manna from heaven." Otherwise, our brother can become an ordinary plebeian, waiting for a change in power, living off his wages and with no inclination to seek other, more advantageous alternatives for determining his present and his future.

Harsh Conditions, Dedovshchina Spur Deserters
92UM1273B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Major Nikolay Yagodin: "The Oath: Those Who Violate It"]

[Text] A Ukrainian army has been created. For what reasons are servicemen going AWOL from their units today? The question has to be answered.

In all the history of the army desertion, the unauthorized departure from one's unit, peaked during and paralleled the collapse of the great empire. The "indestructible and legendary" empire was no longer able to restrain its glorious sons, who were breaking through all cordons, surging toward their "native shores." "Patriotic" motives—a desire to protect their own republic—were used to create a climate of impunity for violating the oath. And in fact, just who was to bring to justice those leaving their units without authorization? There was no longer a state and therefore no laws established by it.

Back at their own hearth and home, the deserters were forgiven. Commanders in the newly formed national armed formations forgave them their sins. As the saying goes, he who thinks of the past is blind in one eye. That is understandable. But like a coin, every proverb has its reverse side. And the parable is this: "...and he who

forgets it is blind in both." This is the beginning of the embodiment of folk wisdom in life.

The deserters do not like to talk about their military past. If they do open up, it is only in order to give greater credibility to their justification for deserting. In 99% of the cases either commanders or fellow soldiers are to blame for their ruined life. I once questioned the facts presented by one AWOL soldier. I sent an enquiry to his v/ch [military unit]. I explained everything the deserter had told me. The answer came sooner than I expected. It turned out that Pvt S. Zarubin had not been an ideal soldier. He had frequently made fun of the new recruits. On the eve of his desertion he had beaten up Pvt N. Rukavishnikov in the latrine. He feared the consequences, of course, and ran away.

Detailed descriptions of such desertions would fill more than a single page. I want to discuss something else, however. All of those who crossed over the line of legality in the past are still serving in the army. It does not matter what the army is called—Ukrainian, Russian, Moldovan—the essence of the matter has not changed. It is the sacred duty of all servicemen to keep the oath.

The tacit connivance with those who crossed the forbidden line is still bearing abundant fruit. Desertions from the units continue. They desert from Ukraine to Ukraine, from oblast to oblast, from city to city. What is the justification for deserting today? And who is going to defend the violators of the oath?

Two people entered the office one July day, a woman of around 40 and a young man. There were tears in her eyes. He tried to appear calm, but much in his behavior revealed a nervousness.

"Help me save my son's life," the mother suddenly screamed.

I offered them chairs and asked them to tell me what was wrong.

It turned out that the young man was a deserter. He was Vitaliy Valentinovich Golovin. He had been serving in a unit at Chernigov, but then circumstances had forced him to go AWOL from the unit. How? I shall explain it in detail.

Golovin was drafted into the army on 16 October 1990. He first served in the Western Group of Forces. Following the unit's withdrawal in June 1991 he was assigned to Chernigov. This is where dark days began for the soldier.

Back in civilian life he had received a craniocerebral injury. Due to a strange confluence of circumstances he was not exempted from the service, but was sent to serve. He spent the first two months in the hospital.

"The doctor told me that I could not stand the strain," Golovin told me. "The Union should therefore give me an exemption."

Instead of that, Golovin was assigned to a construction battalion.

It is difficult to say whether the fate of all the new men is this unjust or Vitaliy somehow attracted the attention of the old-timers. One thing is clear, however. From the very first Golovin was the target of humiliation and beatings by the latter.

Golovin did not work in construction. He got himself assigned to the messhall as a stoker. He spent all of his time there.

Once Pvt Gnisko, who had seniority, demanded that Golovin carry a heavy piece of sheet metal for him. Golovin refused.

"He beat me badly," Golovin told me, "and threatened to continue the reprisal in the company that evening. I know from the experience of others what awaited me in the barracks. Naturally, I did not return there that night. I left the unit that same day.

"My wanderings did not last long that time. I knew that sooner or later I would have to go back. I had no sooner crossed the threshold of 'my' barracks, however, when I was beaten up again by intoxicated fellow soldiers Makarenko, Razin and Zhitnikov.

"I told Lieutenant-Colonel Solodovnikov, the unit commander, everything. I held nothing back. It seemed to me that he understood. He even allowed me to stop sleeping in the barracks. I spent all my time in the messhall. During the day I worked in the boiler room, but when evening came I would ask the cooks to lock me up in the food storeroom.

"Several times those about to be demobilized tried to find me. They would go up to the door and try the knob, see that the door was locked and go away.

"Some time later Solodovnikov was discharged and replaced by Major Koval. Everything changed right there.

"Without finding out why I had moved from the barracks to the messhall, he ordered me to return to the barracks. I tried to explain to him that they would beat me up in the barracks. He would not even listen, however. He merely reprimanded me for my appearance. I could not stay clean working in the furnace room, of course. And I could not change into a clean uniform, since the company first sergeant had not issued me a new one. By the way, I was the only one in the subunit to be treated this way. Oh, I completely forgot. When I told Koval about the humiliations, he suggested that I hit them over the head with a stool the next time they harassed me.

"After my talk with the new commander, I no longer worked in the furnace room. I did not intend to return to the barracks to be maimed by Gnisko and his ilk, however. I began sleeping in the messhall again. This could not go on long, though. I had to find another way

out. I decided to run away, go home to Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and ask the military commissariat to transfer me to a different unit. I did not succeed in boarding a train, however. I was arrested by a patrol.

"After that I was placed into a psychiatric hospital in the village of Khalyavino by order of Major Koval. They treated me for two weeks with medicine which makes me very sick.

"When I spoke with the chief physician, I tried to convince him that I am a very normal person. I gave him my word that I would run away if they did not sign me out. The diagnosis: 'Disciplinary steps should be taken.'

"That was the last straw, which broke the back of my patience. I did run away, and here I am.

"I am not refusing to serve out my term in the army. But not in the unit I left...."

Now the reader knows what occurred with one of our deserters. Yes, he went AWOL from the unit. He violated the oath. The law is not on his side. It would seem that the justice system holds all the cards. But were those who drove the soldier to commit the crime, who with their inaction created a climate of mockery and insults toward the new soldiers, were they acting in accordance with the law?

There was Lieutenant-Colonel Solodovnikov, about whom the deserter had good things to say, you will recall: "He understood me and tried to help...." But what kind of "help" did he give Golovin? He isolated the latter from the other personnel, permitting him to sleep in the messhall, instead of straightening out those who were causing trouble in the collective. What kind of help is that from a commander upon whom the youth perhaps pin all their hopes?

Major Koval's behavior also seems very strange. He had the person placed into a psychiatric hospital. On what grounds? A psychiatric hospital is not the same as a consultation with a neuropathologist. Incidentally, Koval has persistently refused to answer numerous enquiries sent to him. But then, I did not ask him for much—just to send me copies of the documents on the basis of which Private Vitaliy Vlaentinovich Golovin was placed into a psychiatric hospital, where he underwent "treatment" which I believe was certainly not harmless to his health. Who is going to answer for that?

We frequently ask ourselves why people leave the army. Leave the military units without authorization? Desert? There is no simple answer to this question, I am certain. There are different circumstances, different reasons. The case I described, however, still makes one think: Are the commanders doing everything within their power to prevent these things from happening? Could Major Koval have erected a barrier to the dedovshchina and prevented the harassment of the youth by the older servicemen? I am confident that he could have!

Language Problems in Officer Training Viewed

92UM1273A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel (Res) Yaroslav Podolyak: "Is it Difficult to Reestablish the Ukrainian Language in the Army?"]

[Text] Practical psychology can be of inestimable help in this matter.

One of the problems of military psychology, apart from loud appeals to study the individual and his performance, is that of making a sociopsychological evaluation of military speech (command, pedagogical, staff, engineering and so forth).

Speech is the main means of communication, influence and control of people. Who, if not the officer, should have a perfect command of his main tool. Strangely, however, no one is teaching him the rules and techniques of using speech. He is forced to enhance his linguistic culture on his own, since he understands that any imprecision, ambiguity or duality of meaning in an order or a command in a rapid-moving combat situation can result in the deaths of people and failure to accomplish the combat mission.

It is a well-known fact that even daily communication can be a source of stress in servicemen if linguistic etiquette is absent. How easily sharp words and crude expressions roll off the tongues of individual commanders, and how difficult it is for many of them to apologize for their crude behavior. At some point the delicate feelings of the offended one can no longer bear it, the individual explodes and is brought to account for insubordination, for disrespect to a superior. Which one first broke the rules of regulation relations? The subordinate who did not obey or the superior who provoked his subordinate? I believe the answer is clear. Those in charge must be taught communication culture—not just oral, but written as well.

Let us take a look at how an officer's linguistic culture is shaped and what can be done to develop it in the Ukrainian military.

There is no question that the roots of language sprout within the family. A child absorbs the native speech and subconsciously imitates the dialect spoken by his parents and peers. Then he starts school, and the first breakdown of stereotypes begins. Through the efforts of his teachers the state language replaces his national, family language. Until recently this was the Russian language in towns and cities of Ukraine. Without a knowledge of Russian grammar and literature one could not enter a higher educational institution. Having completed secondary school in the Ukrainian language, the rural kid would frequently fail the VUZ entrance exams.

Although the exam on Russian language and literature was always a secondary matter at military schools of the former Union, the acceptance commission was still

interested in how well an applicant from a national minority knew the Russian language. Upon receiving a "two" on a composition, the young person would wonder why he had to take the exam in Russian when his schooling had been in his national language. His dream of becoming an officer was crushed against the premise of "internationalism," based on which the training and subsequent military service in the multinational military were conducted exclusively in the Russian language. So the high-school graduate would travel from one end of the country to the other at the expense of the Ministry of Defense, only to receive an "unsatisfactory" after failing to understand the question on the very first exam and be sent home. He would then be drafted as a military construction worker, and they understood one another without words.

I recall the case of A. Mutalibov, an applicant for admission to a military school. He took the exams conscientiously, but he wrote the composition in the Azeri language. We asked him to translate it into Russian. We could see that he did not know the most basic rules of grammar, even though his certificate showed excellent grades in his Russian subjects. The commission made a bold decision: to admit Mutalibov to the school on the basis that he had done well on the entrance exams in mathematics and physics and that he would rapidly master the Russian language.

Here is another case. S. Zabrodskiy, a young man from near Stryy, used numerous Ukrainian words in his composition, received a "two" and went back home. He worked on his Russian grammar all year. The next year he earned a "satisfactory" on the exam and was accepted at the school on the basis of total points.

It is difficult for everyone studying at a VUZ, but it is especially difficult for those young people who are accustomed from childhood to thinking in a language other than Russian. As he listened to a lecture Mutalibov slowly translated the words into Azeri, for example, and Zabrodskiy even tried to write down what the instructor said in Ukrainian. The instructor does not care who thinks in what language or how rapidly he is understood. He is required to present the scheduled material within a specified period of time. In the practical classes and seminars the instructor rarely pays attention to how the cadets speak or how they write their summaries. The cadets become accustomed to illiterate communication and cliches, and are surprised when they are corrected for distorted pronunciation or incorrect accent and are upset when one of them is sent out of the class for using foul language.

And so, sociopsychological studies have shown that military educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense selected either youth of Russian nationality or those from outlying areas with a good command of the Russian language. This is borne out by statistics on the ratio of officers and generals of Russian and non-Russian nationality. Furthermore, many military educational institutions, except the political institutions, did not

concern themselves with the linguistic culture of the future officers. If a young person did not improve on his own, his literacy level rose very little during his studies at the school. It is therefore not surprising that individual military chiefs experience great difficulties with both oral and written speech.

There are other problems in addition to these in the development of the armed forces of Ukraine. They have to do with the transition to the Ukrainian language. A decree or an order is not enough. We need scientific conclusions, an in-depth social and psychological study and optimal methods of retraining all personnel of the Ukrainian army and navy.

The first thing we need to do is to provide military personnel with Russian-Ukrainian glossaries of military terms and commands.

The second is to make an expert sociopsychological evaluation of the drafts of regulations of the armed forces of Ukraine, to translate them into Ukrainian and print them in both languages.

The third thing is to offer the high-school graduate a choice of taking the entrance exams in Russian or Ukrainian.

The fourth thing we need to do is to begin the gradual transition from lectures and textbooks in Russian to Ukrainian at military educational institutions and to authorize the cadets to take tests in the Ukrainian language.

And the fifth thing we need to do is to establish elective courses on the Ukrainian language and literature for all servicemen with an interest in them.

Suggestions To Improve Language Training, Patriotism of Troops

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8 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Goncharenko, Oleg Sergeyevich Bodruk, and Eduard Mikhaylovich Lisitsyn: "Approaches, Alternatives, Problems, Developments: Ukraine's National Security Concept"]

[Text] (For the beginning of this article, See the 13 June 1992 issue of NARODNAYA ARMIYA).

National security is a measure of the absence of threats to human rights and freedoms and to the basic interests and values of a sovereign national state.

Minimizing the level of threats suggests the existence and functioning of military-political, economic, ecological, socio-cultural, and other mechanisms that compose the NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM and that insure the protection of the population both from undesirable external influences and also from the illegal and anti-human activities of state, government, and party structures.

Let's immediately stress that this definition substantially broadens the traditional interpretations of the concept of "national security" not only by introducing additional measurements in the economic, ecological, and national-cultural and other spheres but also by proclaiming the unconditional primacy of human rights and freedoms over the rights of the state.

This expansion of the concept has become absolutely necessary under contemporary conditions since the depravity of attempts to view the problems of national security exclusively from the military-political point of view is obvious. The continuing stake both of the industrially developed countries and also of the countries that are developing on military force, not only does not increase but also substantially reduces the level of their national security and undermines their economy, competitiveness, science, and culture and, what is especially dangerous, the very viability of man, society, and the planet as a whole.

Ukraine's national security problems are multifaceted in nature and consist not only of the general characteristics that were examined in the first article but also the specific traits that ensue both from the difficulties of development of a young multiethnic power that is at the stage of establishing its own state system but also from a number of geopolitical, economic, ecological, historical, and socio-cultural characteristics of the country and its environment.

The following may be noted among the most important specific features of Ukraine's national security problems.

The Absence of Full-Blooded National Statehood That Meets Internal and External Requirements.

Ukraine, as it has already been pointed out, has just begun to form its own state system. At the same time, an effective national security system assumes the presence of powerful state institutions that are capable of guaranteeing observance of human rights and freedoms and of protecting the population from internal and external threats. The lack of adequate state capabilities and mechanisms for ensuring national security inevitably engenders a number of problems of an external and internal nature.

The Absence of a Stable Consensus on National Security Problems.

The traditional understanding of national security is understood to be the presence of a unique social contract between the people, who are viewed as the bearer of a definite national mentality, and the state. Under conditions of the absence of this consensus (the formation of which requires an adequately prolonged period of time of the existence of statehood), competing interpretations of the concept of national security inevitably exist with various social and ethnic groups. This, on the one hand, objectively diminishes the effectiveness of the functioning of state institutions and, on the other hand, substantially reduces the general level of security for all social and ethnic groups without exception.

The Absence of a Truly Democratic Parliament and Government.

The contemporary undemocratically elected parliament in no way reflects the palette of interests of the peoples of Ukraine. This applies to an even greater degree to the government structures that have been created primarily from the representatives of the old administrative-command system. With the silent concurrence of the President and the support of the former Communist Party majority in parliament, the government has made a reality of the interests of the old nomenklatura that was connected by common corporate interests. At the same time, having picked up the slogans of the national movement and having outplayed the democrats on their own territory, the country's ruling circles have turned out to be incapable of proposing an effective program of economic and social development.

As a result, the country has found itself in a very deep crisis, is on the verge of political paralysis and is incapable of mobilizing the existing potential of natural, economic, scientific-technical and human resources.

The situation is also being complicated by the presence of a number of errors (and their consequences) that were made in the sphere of foreign and domestic policy, and which have seriously undermined both Ukraine's "image" abroad and also social stability within the country. This is primarily a question of Ukraine's contradictory and inconsistent position in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, of the government's indecisiveness with regard to the Black Sea Fleet and military formations that are under Russia's control as whole and of the direct indulgences and concessions to separatist forces and the anticommunist activities of certain forces in the republic, of the deliberate sabotage by the government of a number of radical reforms directed at the creation of a full-blooded market economy, and others.

Let's also point out the potential danger of Ukraine's rash proclamation of the desire to become a neutral power. **First of all**, total neutrality cannot exist in principle under contemporary conditions (all the more so for a country with the potential and capabilities of Ukraine). Current agreements with the CIS countries (with the domination of Russia's ambitions) bring Ukraine approximately the same security as the Warsaw Treaty brought Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 (or that same CIS brings to Moldova in 1992).

Secondly, the hasty proclamation of neutrality can interfere with Ukraine's integration into existing European and international security structures.

The Weakness and Slow Rates for Implementing Conversion Programs, Building the National Armed Forces and Reform of the Ukrainian Security Service

In the former USSR, nearly 60 percent of Ukraine's entire industry was oriented to the needs of the military-industrial complex. The total strength of the work force

involved at the present time at military-industrial complex enterprises exceeds 40 percent of the total able-bodied population. Under conditions of the disruption of the cycle of military production in Ukraine and the progressive reduction of military orders in Russia, the absence of urgent and most decisive measures for conversion of military industry can already in the near future result in the most serious economic consequences and social conflicts and could undermine the very idea of Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, the government not only does not have any purposeful program whatsoever in this sphere but so far has not even developed a general concept for implementing conversion in Ukraine.

Matters are somewhat better in the republic with military reform. However, also in this case we must admit that the rates of construction of the national armed forces are inadequate both in scale and in perspective. The absence of proper political decisions is impeding both the creation of our own navy and the resolution of the issue on the withdrawal of the 200,000 man CIS troop formation from the territory of Ukraine.

The issue associated with the creation of the Ukrainian Security Service (USS) is far from being resolved. Measures for the transformation of the former Ukrainian KGB, that was created at one time as an instrument of political supervision and investigation, was largely cosmetic in nature. The USS's incompetence, lack of professionalism, indecisiveness, and passivity was clearly manifested on the "Crimean issue" and in the resolution of problems associated with the unconstitutional activities of a number of separatist movements and formations. The impression is being created that a number of USS leaders simply do not understand where the primary threats to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity originate.

At the same time, USS claims to a dominant role in the Ukrainian national security system that is being formed are intensifying. The USS must undoubtedly be a part of that system. But only as one of the many elements that have their precisely defined limited functions. Any attempts by the intelligence services to appropriate a "special role" for themselves in this system is not only unconstitutional in its essence but also unacceptable in principle for any civilized democracy.

Primary Threats to Ukrainian National Security

The primary threats to Ukrainian national security are extremely multifaceted in their structure and with a well-known fraction of conventionality can be divided into internal and external threats.

INTERNAL THREATS:

1. The collapse of economic reform, social instability and disorders.
2. Ethnic conflicts and civil war.

3. A national-communist coup with the possible participation of the armed forces.

4. Ecological degeneration.

EXTERNAL THREATS:

1. Russian expansionism and Russia's military machine.

2. Externally stimulated interethnic conflicts and the territorial breakup of Ukraine.

3. Economic blockade and economic (nuclear) blackmail.

4. Territorial claims and Ukrainian involvement in interstate conflicts.

5. Pan-Slavic ideology and Russian socio-cultural domination.

An Objective Need for Ukraine to Coexist and Cooperate with a Uniquely Unstable International Environment

The disintegration of the USSR, the collapse of the system of "Russian Neocolonialism" in Eastern Europe, the emergence of an entire spectrum of independent, semi-independent, and totally independent states in the region, the extended postnatal convulsions of the young Russian democracy and the continuing political chaos in Russia as a whole have resulted in the formation of a uniquely unstable and unpredictable international environment in this part of Europe. The situation is being substantially complicated by the problems of voluntarily established territorial borders and by the claims of ethnic Russians (with the support and inspiration of the conflicts of pro-imperial forces in Russia) for special privileges and a role in the young independent states and which reinforce Russia's imperial ambitions in the region.

Ukraine has therefore been compelled to structure its state system and its national security system in an extremely unstable environment with the practical absence of any allies whatsoever in the outside world.

The specific problems examined above largely define the possible approaches to the formation of a general Concept of Ukrainian National Security.

Another group of the most important factors that determine the Concept of Ukrainian National Security can be obtained from analysis of the fundamental values and vitally important interests of sovereign Ukraine.

Ukraine's National Interests

As we have already previously noted, the hyperrationalization of fundamental national interests can be carried out by ferreting them out from society's basic values and also a number of parameters of an internal (economic system, socio-cultural characteristics) and external (international environment, allies, etc.) nature.

However, let's point out that the defining influence of society's basic values on the formation of national interests and goals does not nearly exclude the possibility of the reverse influence. So, for example, if a state under certain conditions begins to perceive events in the international environment as a direct threat to its existence, survival becomes the most important national priority. The national values, the hierarchy of their significance, strategy and policy are changed accordingly. The traditional values cited above, those such as "democracy", "economic well-being", "equality", and so forth give way to the values of "self-preservation", "combat readiness", "national unity", etc.

Thus, the national interests, national goals and basic values that play the most important role in policy and strategy in the sphere of national security form their own sufficiently complicated system which, regardless of stability, traditionalism, historical and ethnographic peculiarities, preserve at the same time a certain dynamism which ensures its adaptation to the changes of the international environment, mass consciousness and social existence.

While considering everything that has been set forth above, let's define Ukraine's basic interests as a sovereign European power for the coming decades.

Vitally Important Interests:

1. Maintenance and preservation of the republic's territorial integrity. Defense of its borders, sovereignty and national state system, using all means at its disposal (military, if necessary).

2. Creation of an adequate national security system—military-political, economic, legal, socio-cultural, and other. This is understood to be the further consolidation of national state system, the national armed forces, national guard and border troops, creation of gold and hard currency funds, modern banking, financial and communications structures, our own hard currency, effective diplomatic and customs services, internal security structures, strategic planning systems, military, foreign policy and scientific-technical intelligence, etc.

3. The most rapid and total nuclear disarmament under international control. Ukraine's comprehensive integration into regional and global security systems. The conduct of wide-scale programs to eliminate the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe and the creation of a comprehensive system for Ukraine's nuclear security.

4. The rapid transition of the republic's economy to full economic independence through mobilization and development of our own capabilities, market structures and radical reform of the economy. Denationalization and gradual privatization of the majority of industrial facilities (including military-industrial complex enterprises).

5. Integration of Ukraine into the world economic and political community. Creation of conditions to attract

foreign investments, preserve old and create new access channels to strategically important resources for the republic's economy—oil and energy resources as a whole, rubber, ferrous metals, lumber, cotton, etc.

6. A fundamental review of the existing practice of economic ties and price formation and delivery systems with the other CIS countries. As economic independence is attained and our own reserves of strategic raw materials and energy resources are created, shift to accounting for export-import transactions based on international market prices and in hard currency. Total cessation of the financing of CIS military programs and a general course toward the most rapid withdrawal from this political formation as not responding to the interests of the Ukrainian people.

7. Development and maintenance of the processes of socio-cultural and spiritual revival as the foundations of national state system of the Ukrainian people.

List the Following Among the Ukrainian State's Other Priority Interests:

- comprehensive expansion of Ukraine's direct participation in the activities of international institutions and organizations and in the global level system of economic and political processes, specifically the Helsinki process, and in other European economic and political structures;
- development of transportation lines (sea, land, and air) and information and telecommunication systems needed for the normal development of the economy and protection of the republic's interests. Creation of a national ocean fleet, modern air carrier companies, and transport corporations;
- development of economic and cultural contacts with the Ukrainian Diaspora, with the countries that have a significant portion of the population of Ukrainian ancestry (the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Israel, and others), and support of Ukrainian national minorities in the CIS countries;
- unconditional fulfillment of all international treaties and obligations both in the sphere of disarmament and security and in the sphere of human rights and freedoms, free immigration and emigration, individual contacts and entrepreneurship; and,
- formation of a flexible and balanced policy in the sphere of interethnic relations and relations with the CIS countries. Organization and conduct under international control with UN involvement (if necessary—the International Court at the Hague) of comprehensive negotiations on the division of the property of the former USSR, including the issue on gold and hard currency reserves, CPSU accounts, property abroad, etc.

Finally, let's point out that the development of the national security concept requires not only the study of fundamental national interests and goals but also the

comprehensive analysis and classification of the entire spectrum of threats to the young Ukrainian state both of an external and of an internal nature.

First of all, let's point out that in this article there is no possibility whatsoever of comprehensively discussing the entire spectrum of internal and external threats to Ukrainian national security. Each of them is a theme for a separate and quite serious examination and this was done in a number of works of authors who, both from the appropriate developments of the Moscow centers of MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations], IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations], the Institute of Europe and others, naturally were restricted in nature. Therefore, here we are restricted to a brief commentary on this issue

Let's begin with the fact that the majority of the threats of an internal nature, with the exception, possibly, of the latter, are directly or indirectly associated with the general economic situation in Ukraine. If Ukraine with its industrial and, the main thing, agricultural potential, will albeit be "reasonably successful" in the conduct of economic reform and the general standard of living (first of all food products) will be better in Ukraine than in the other CIS countries, the first two factors with the absence of "stimulation from without" can actually be removed from consideration.

The issue on the possibility of a national-communist coup is more complex, although in many aspects is also most closely associated with the economic situation in Ukraine.

Actually this quiet, "creeping" (Leninist definition) or "velvet" (an appropriate Czechoslovak neologism) counterrevolution has already begun. It is being clearly traced in the activities of the proponents of that same enlightened socialist future who have changed their colors and in the activities of the government and in the President's cadre policy and in a whole series of other little noticed political events in Ukraine that are quite well blended into the overall scenario. Consequently the question is not whether or not this variation of a nomenklatura coup is possible or impossible in Ukraine, but how successful this coup will be.

And here a democratic society, that is divided and that has largely lost its political orientations but which believes in the democratic future of Ukraine and in its President, must have its say. Because right now it seems like the "moment of truth" is approaching for it. The last of the most serious threats is not socio-political but socio-ecological in nature. The ecological situation in Ukraine, still prior to the Chernobyl disaster, has reached its crisis point. At the present time, Ukraine is the most ecologically unfavorable area of Europe and political figures, both in this country and beyond its borders, must finally understand that without a solution of the ecological problems (including the problems of nuclear safety) the very idea of Ukrainian statehood may simply lose sense.

The primary external threats to Ukrainian national security are directly or indirectly associated with Russia and Russian foreign and domestic policy. The problem of coexistence with a powerful and expansionistically-minded neighbor is as old as the world and has been sufficiently well studied by history. "Poor Mexico," one of the leaders of the Mexican Revolution said at one time, "is too far from God and too close to the United States".

However, it is characteristic that it is the United States, decades after the situation that was described above, that is demonstrating models of civilized resolution of the problems of coexistence both with Mexico and with Canada. We would like to believe that Russian democracy will find within itself the forces to overcome the relapses of the imperial mentality and finally recognize two truths: first, that the emergence of Ukraine as an independent sovereign state is an historically completed fact which it is already impossible to challenge or to attempt to change and, second, that overcoming the imperial mentality and Russian Great Power Chauvinism (with the good wishes and concrete actions for the defense of the Russian-speaking population from the Oder to Alaska and California) is first of all in the interests of Russia itself if it actually wants to be among the civilized countries of the modern world.

(to be continued)

Suggestions To Improve Language Training, Patriotism of Troops

92UM1275A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Army Public Information and Communications Department Personnel Section Chief Colonel V. Bulenko, under the rubric: "Humanitarian Training, Problems, Opinions": "How Do We Climb Up the Mountain Pass?"]

[Text] With the beginning of summer combat training, they also began classes in the humanitarian training system. But just prior to that, group leader assemblies occurred in our army at which the issues concerning the future improvement of humanitarian training and the increase of its influence on the results of personnel training, service and education were thoroughly and comprehensively examined. I think that the participants in them derived quite a bit of valuable and useful information from them, they armed themselves with work experience and with teaching skills to organize and conduct classes on one of the primary training topics.

Today it would seem that there is no reason to fear that the shortcomings that are inherent to humanitarian training in the winter training period will manifest themselves during the course of summer training. But still: will we be able to skillfully and effectively impact the soldier's minds and consciousness and to form an active, vital position among them? I think it is early to

remove this issue from the agenda. In any case, to deny it is lackadaisical. And this is why.

By way of illustration, take the leaders of the humanitarian training groups. In the recent past they were, for the most part, leaders of political training groups. Having (and we must admit this) a great deal of experience teaching this discipline, many of them turned out to be incapable of rapidly changing their work methods under current conditions, of redirecting themselves, or of rejecting the old dogmas and stereotypes that had developed over decades.

That is, so to speak, one category of people. Another is the officers who, following the dictates of their hearts, have taken the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. With the spirit of men on a mission, they have aggressively conducted work on training personnel about the history of our state, the laws on military issues, and on the acts of sovereignty and state independence. But the activities of these true patriots of their Homeland were uncoordinated at a number of units and did not receive proper support from commanders and leaders. That is why we now have to literally gather a grain at a time the small amount of humanitarian training experience that was amassed during the last training period.

Another extremely important problem consists of the fact that more than 60 percent of the group leaders in our army do not know or have little knowledge of the Ukrainian language. Hence, classes are not highly effective and students learn little of the programmed material.

And, finally, the third reason which is having a substantial impact both on increasing the leaders' teaching skills and on increasing the soldiers' theoretical knowledge. Incidentally, NARODNAYA ARMIYA has already written about it more than once. I have in mind the scarcity, or precisely, the lack of a humanitarian training facility in the troops. So, during the last training period we received only one of O. Subtelnyy's "Istoriya Ukrainy" [History of Ukraine] textbooks per regiment. Matters with literature are also atrocious. The former Lenin Rooms are slowly being converted into People's Reading Rooms [Narodnoznachchi svitlitsi]. There is no money.

There are also other problems and, if they are not resolved, it is difficult if not simply impossible to count on progress in soldiers' successful mastery of the humanitarian training program. Our training organizers are doing everything and will do everything that is required of them. For example, in Dnepropetrovsk Garrison units and subunits, definite experience has been accumulated in organizing and conducting training on this training topic. Specifically, a permanent group leader teaching methods training center has been created at the air-defense missile school at which on a weekly basis, every Tuesday, teachers from Dnepropetrovsk State University [DSU] lecture the officers on Ukrainian history. This year a textbook on the history of our state will be

prepared and published through the efforts of this learning institution's collective.

Incidentally, we have not refused the services of higher educational institution teachers even during the previously mentioned assemblies. Lectures on the first 6-8 topics were conducted by representatives of DSU, the Pedagogical Institutes of Krivoy Rog and Lugansk, and Kharkov Polytechnical Institute, as well as workers from the historical and regional studies museums of Artemovsk, Uman and Krivoy Rog. The presentations of the Ukrainian President's representatives to oblasts and cities, Rukh, and a number of other social organizations and movements were listened to with great interest.

To increase the effectiveness of classes in the humanitarian training system, Army Commander Major-General V. Shkidchenko made the following decision:

Voluntarily create permanent training methodology centers to train humanitarian training group leaders at garrisons based on GDO [expansion not given], GDK [expansion not given] and soldiers clubs. Develop and conclude agreements on presenting lectures with VUZs [higher educational institutions], technicums and schools. Enlist officers, warrant officers and servicemen's family members who have a good knowledge of the Ukrainian language and who know the history of our state to conduct classes in the groups;

—Accelerate teaching the Ukrainian language to group leaders;

—Subscribe to additional newspapers, magazines and printed material on Ukrainian history for division-sized and smaller units. Replenish library funds with books in the native language through patrons and social organizations;

—More fully utilize educational work time, the resources of clubs, libraries, the bulletin board press, and local radio and television broadcasts; and,

—Allocate no less than four hours of duty time in the afternoon per week to train leaders for their classes.

Of course, there will still be difficulties with organizing humanitarian training. But they will not disappear on their own (and everyone should understand that). Only through joint efforts can we climb the mountain pass and remove humanitarian training from the sphere of an educational to the sphere of a real formation among students of such qualities as high responsibility for the security of our state, exceptional performance and discipline and the desire to constantly improve their professional skill.

Official on Progress, Problems of Ukrainian Draft
92UM1332A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Ukrainian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the Main Staff Major-General Anatoliy Vasilyevich

Palamarchuk by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Anatoliy Polyakov, under the rubric: "In the CIS Armies": "An Agitation and Propaganda Train Is Conscripting for Service"]

[Text] The draft into its own Armed Forces was conducted in Ukraine for the first time. How was it organized, what difficulties were there in the matter of manning its own army, and how were issues of cooperation with other CIS countries resolved? Our Correspondent Colonel Anatoliy Polyakov talked about that with Ukrainian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the Main Staff Major-General Anatoliy Palamarchuk.

[Polyakov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, based on what principle is the Ukrainian Army being manned and how many years do soldiers and sergeants have to serve?

[Palamarchuk] First of all I want to stress that the draft was organized based on legislative acts on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Young men who have reached 18 years of age were drafted for 18 months. They will all serve in Ukraine.

[Polyakov] That is, not a single conscript from the current Spring will be sent outside the borders of Ukraine?

[Palamarchuk] Based on a reciprocal agreement with the CIS countries ministries of defense, we are sending a certain number of young soldiers to training subunits located outside the borders of Ukraine, but we will receive that same number of soldiers for training in our army. But after completion of the training subunits, their graduates will return to serve in the states of which they are citizens.

[Polyakov] You said that now service in the Ukrainian Army totals 18 months. But when will this procedure be implemented?

[Palamarchuk] The law has already entered into force. The mechanism of its execution is as follows. From Spring 1993, soldiers and sergeants who have served 1.5 years and who are in positions that do not determine combat readiness will be released into the reserve. In Autumn 1993, all who have served 18 months.

[Polyakov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, we have learned from unofficial sources that Ukraine is experiencing difficulties with the draft contingent. They say that there is a shortage of almost half of the required number of young men to fulfill the draft plan and suddenly draft evaders have appeared...

[Palamarchuk] Actually, there are certain difficulties. But the fact is not that we have inadequate manpower resources. By the present time, all compulsory service military personnel from the other CIS countries have been transferred from Ukraine. But not very many soldiers and sergeants are returning to our country. And right now nearly 100,000 of our citizens are serving beyond the borders of Ukraine. We are not drafting those who are immediately leaving their military units

and returning to the Homeland. No, we hope that we will resolve everything through negotiations and agreements.

As for "draft evaders", there have also been such cases, although few in number. They arise from a certain nihilism of young men and society's disrespect for the law in general. Incidentally, the term of service for those young men who evade the draft will be extended for the time of their "game of hide and seek" with the military commissariat. Young men must proceed with joy to serve independent Ukraine. For example, recently during a ten day period a special agitation and propaganda train traveled through the cities of Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Kharkov, and Poltava... Lawyers, Ministry of Defense representatives, and performing artists met with conscripts and their parents...

[Polyakov] The cities named are the oblast centers of Southeastern Ukraine. Doesn't that signify that the young men there don't want to serve independent Ukraine?

[Palamarchuk] No, the most significant draft resources are simply located there. The draft is proceeding according to plan. And in the autumn, the agitation and propaganda train will travel through the oblasts of Western Ukraine.

[Polyakov] What can you say about the problem of manning the Black Sea Fleet with conscripts from Ukraine?

[Palamarchuk] We intend to provide the fleet with a total of 12,000 conscripts. As for Russia's plans to resolve this problem, that issue is better addressed to its military department. In Crimea, there is an entire knot of problems and the situation there may change very rapidly. For example, the mothers of conscripts from the Crimea have demanded that their children serve only on the Crimean Peninsula. We met them halfway and more than 1,000 young men will remain in the Crimea.

[Polyakov] I recall how quite recently at rallies and in parliament, while criticizing army formations, many people argued that you only had to make the Armed Forces national and all problems would no longer be relevant. But right now, as one republic newspaper wrote, "they are running in packs" from Ukrainian Army and national guard units. Now already from Kiev—to Poltava, from Chernigov—to Dnepropetrovsk and vice versa...

[Palamarchuk] I once again stress that there are not that many deserters but we should also not hide this problem. The deserters' or absent without leave soldiers' sense of impunity and especially the parents' irresponsibility is having an impact here. Some parents want their children to serve nearly at the family farm. There is no doubt that such concepts as patriotism, loyalty to military duty, and a readiness to endure the difficulties of service have been devalued to some degree. We need to fill them with new meaning and with new content.

BYELARUS

Byelarusians Wishing to Serve at Home Create Cadres Problem for New Army

92UM1281A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Igor Sinyekevich under the "Byelarus" rubric: "No One Wishes to Leave"]

[Text] Each CIS member country is using its own approach to create its own national army. In the case of Byelarus, construction of its own Armed Forces has run into a cadres problem that does not easily lend itself to solution. Of 45,000 officers and warrant officers—natives of Byelarus—who are serving beyond the borders of their native land, about 10,000 have declared their intention to continue their service—in the Byelarusian Army; in addition, the flood of requests for transfer is increasing. At the same time, there were 977 men serving in the Byelarusian Armed Forces announcing their desire to leave the republic so that they can continue to serve, in other areas. Of that number, 732 have already been transferred, with 205 of the latter to Ukraine.

As explained to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent by Colonel Ivan Zubko, chief of the Byelarusian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate, the principal reason for departure given by servicemen of other ethnic origins is a desire to serve closer to home. There are many reasons contributing to Byelarusian natives to return to their historic motherland. There is sufficient cause for officers and warrant officers stationed in the hot spots to leave those areas. Zubko said that he gained the impression during his talks with servicemen that the conditions there are unbearable. Byelarus's countrymen are dismayed at the thought of protecting someone else's interests. And no mention is made at all of the fact that they are in constant mortal danger. In addition, officers cannot provide for their dependents, the majority of whom the officers have sent to untroubled areas, due to restrictions many republics impose on remittances originating in other countries of the ruble zone. Information possessed by the Personnel Directorate indicates that about 5,000 Byelarusian men are in service in hot spots. According to Colonel General Pavel Kozlovskiy, the republic's minister of defense, it is this category that has been accorded priority status for transfer to the Byelarusian Army.

Also anxious to take their place around the red-and-white flag are Byelarusians stationed in sparsely-populated areas subject to severe climatic conditions: primarily the Transbaykal and Far East Military Districts. If often happens that servicemen are forced to leave places to which they have been accustomed, due to political decisions made by local authorities. Thus, Byelarus's southern neighbor is discharging servicemen who have not taken the Ukrainian oath of allegiance. The

future is also uncertain in other republics. For example, Kyrgyzstan has decided to appoint only Kyrgyz nationals to positions of command.

The disproportion between the number of persons wishing to serve in Byelarus and those desiring to leave is attributable to the republic's attractiveness in the eyes of military men. For example, in the present Byelarusian Army only 10 percent of the officer corps consists of Byelarusians, with Russians and Ukrainians predominating in the remainder. However, neither group is entertaining any thoughts of leaving, since the treatment accorded servicemen here is traditionally favorable; the republic is stable, and social conditions acceptable. Incidentally, the republic's leadership is in no hurry to require officers and warrant officers to swear the oath of allegiance to Byelarus; only recruits are presently taking the oath.

The republic Ministry of Defense has found it possible to recall and reassign 10,060 Byelarusian servicemen—only a tenth of all those on the list. In addition to that, 3,000 graduates of military schools will be reporting to their units for duty this year. According to Ivan Zubko, a sufficient number of motorized rifle platoon leader slots will become available only in the year 2006, while it will be 2004 when tank platoon leader assignments will be made. In his answer to the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's question as to whether plans for organizing officer regiments exist, he said: "No." He stated that this is a luxury the republic's meager defense budget cannot afford. It is true that the Ministry of Defense has issued an order granting permission to place junior officers into noncommissioned officer slots as tank and weapons commanders, but this generally has not been warmly received by the officers affected.

The situation is exacerbated by the reductions the Byelarusian Armed Forces are facing. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already reported that the republic is suffering a troop surplus. The strength of the Byelarusian Armed Forces stands at 130,000 men, with another 35,000 serving in the Strategic Forces under the unified command of the CIS. Plans call for reducing the Byelarusian Army to 90,000 men in the coming two to three years. It is planned to maintain at some future time an Army consisting of 60,000 to 70,000 men. According to Minister of Defense Pavel Kozlovskiy, 22,000 officers and warrant officers will be released from the service, something which has not happened since the end of the Second World War.

Minsk Commander on Creation of Special-Purpose Company

92UM1344B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel Vatslav Stesik, military commandant of the city of Minsk, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Kovalev under the

rubric "In the CIS Armies": "A Special-Purpose Company, but Essentially Military Police"]

[Text] The question of establishing special subunits in the army similar to the military police in a number of Western nations came up even prior to the collapse of the USSR. The matter never went beyond the point of discussion, however. Now, though, the first practical step has been taken in this direction, in the armed forces of Byelarus. Under an order issued by Colonel-General P. Kozlovskiy, the republic's defense minister, a special-purpose company has now been formed out of one of the subunits of the 120th Guards Rogachev Motorized-Rifle Division.

Our correspondent interviewed Colonel V. Stesik, military commandant of the city of Minsk, who is directly in command of this company.

[Stesik] I suggested that such subunits be formed a long time ago. Like any other job, the commandant's service requires professionalism, all the more in such a large city as Minsk. Those servicemen who are outfitted from the garrison units to perform it are amateurs, if I may say so. They lack experience and to some extent the professional skills for performing the specific jobs. Particularly today, when the crime situation in Byelarus has deteriorated significantly, when there are dozens of deserters running around the republic who have abandoned their units and are eager to return to their native parts in other CIS countries. And even Byelarusian soldiers frequently go AWOL to "visit" home, since home is just an arm's length away today.

After the Ministry of Defense of Byelarus was established, they finally began to listen to and support my suggestion. The minister issued the order to establish a special-purpose company, or RON. Incidentally, there was some argument about what to call it. "Company military police subunit" was suggested. This was rejected, however. The word "police" has too many bitter associations dating back to the last war for many people in Byelarus. The term "military militia" was also not accepted. It could have been confused with military subunits of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] or OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment]. RON is designated for performing approximately the same functions as the military police in the American army.

[Kovalev] And just what are those functions?

[Stesik] Company personnel will perform patrol/post duty in Minsk and completely replace the patrols presently outfitted from the units. In addition, RON is charged with the job of finding and apprehending deserters and enlisted men who have gone AWOL from their units. When necessary they will apprehend servicemen who have committed a crime. They will guard important state facilities—again, if the need arises. Our special-purpose troops will operate closely with the police, performing patrol duty with the latter and helping them to maintain public law and order and to prevent crimes.

[Kovalev] When will the company actually begin to perform its job?

[Stesik] It will be at least four-five months yet. We have to train the personnel properly, after all. A special training program has been worked out for them. The subjects include basic criminal law, military administration, the organization of patrol/post duty, behavioral ethics and culture of servicemen, hand-to-hand combat, personal safety measures, the use of weapons and special gear, and others.

[Kovalev] One would assume, Vatslav Ivanovich, that people are carefully screened for this company.

[Stesik] Of course. And the criteria are stringent. A member of the special-purpose company has to be physically strong, psychologically stable and highly disciplined, have good self-control, have a good knowledge of the laws and regulations, be a bold and decisive person, and be able to stand up for himself and protect others in extreme situations. At first the company will be manned with first-term enlisted men, but it is planned in the future to man it with contract personnel.

[Kovalev] Are similar subunits being set up at other garrisons?

[Stesik] Yes, it is planned to have them in all the oblast centers. They will be platoons and not companies, however. I do not want to play the prophet. This is a new thing, after all, and has not yet been put to the practical test. Nonetheless, I believe that the establishment of such subunits will justify itself.

BALTIC STATES

Embassy Military Counselor Details Latvian Defense Forces

92UM1335A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Gunars Alksnis, military counselor at the Latvian Embassy in the Russian Federation, by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Plotnikov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent, Public Information Center of the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces: "Latvia's Defense Forces"]

[Text] A great deal has changed in recent years in an area covering one sixth of all the land and known in the recent past as the Soviet Union. New, sovereign republics have appeared on the political map of the world. Most of them have joined together to form the Commonwealth of Independent States, but the Baltic countries chose to go their own way. History will in time deliver its verdict as to whether this was good or bad. Today, however, our special correspondent interviews Gunars Alksnis, military counselor at the Latvian Republic's embassy in the Russian Federation, on the problems involved in building a Latvian army.

[Plotnikov] Gunars, we know that the Latvian Republic has set about establishing a national army. But has the legal basis for this been created? Has the republic passed laws on defense?

[Alksnis] The draft Concept of Defense of the Latvian Republic has now been submitted for national consideration and discussion. It sets forth the basic principles for ensuring our national security.

The first of these involves conducting a peace-loving foreign and domestic policy and acknowledging war as a totally unacceptable means of resolving international disagreements and conflicts. The principles rule out the stationing of foreign troops, including those of the Russian armed forces, on Latvian territory, and the conduct of reconnaissance and other military operations against third nations from our nation's territory, and provide for participation by the Latvian Republic in a collective security system of the Baltic region and the European countries.

The main mission of the National Defense Forces is to protect the population and secure the inviolability of our borders and air space, and to suppress any possible acts of provocation or encroachments upon the state's territorial integrity.

With respect to other legislative enactments, we have worked out and ratified the Law on Compulsory Military Service and the Statute on the People's Home Guard. We have also ratified regulations governing the procedure for internal and guard duty, and a number of documents on the organization of training for the personnel.

[Plotnikov] The Defense Forces are being established in Latvia. What will it be like?

[Alksnis] The process of building the Defense Forces is very difficult for a small country such as ours. The economy is in bad shape. Right now our state cannot allocate large sums for defense. In building our national army, however, we do not plan to take the route followed by most states of the former Soviet Union, who assumed jurisdiction over the units and formations of the former Soviet Union located on their territories and talked mainly about how many weapons and supplies would remain with them and how many would go to Russia.

It is planned for the Latvian Defense Forces to have a numerical strength in the range of 9,000-10,000 men. We do not intend to establish branches of armed forces in the classic pattern. We do not plan to have army, corps and division formations. The brigade will be the main formation in peacetime.

Considering the geographic and territorial features of our country, it is planned for the Defense Forces to have the following composition:

1. Border Troops formed into a mixed brigade. The brigade now has 1,200 men, but we plan to increase that to 5,000-6,000 in the future.

2. Naval forces, which will perform the mission of guarding the maritime borders and the commercial naval zone. We plan to have escort vessels and several general-purpose vessels, as well as special vessels for supporting the naval forces.

3. Air and PVO [air defense] forces designated for protecting Latvia's air borders.

4. Mobile motorized-infantry subunits.

As you can see, our armed forces will have purely defensive missions. I repeat, their development depends in great part upon the country's economic state and the possibility of acquiring weapons and equipment from other states, including the Russian Federation. The acquisition of weapons on mutually advantageous terms is directly dependent upon our ability to procure spare parts for them, to perform repairs and to train the specialists. There is something to think about here.

I would like to say something about the second component of Latvia's National Defense Forces, the people's home guard. It will include enlisted men and officers who have completed their regular service term. They will comprise a mobilization reserve manned in peacetime on a territorial basis.

[Plotnikov] Gunars, the structure of your higher military agencies of administration has also taken shape for now, has it not?

[Alksnis] Yes, it has. The State Defense Council is the highest agency of control of the armed forces. It is subordinate to the Supreme Council of the Latvian Republic. Its membership includes, from the parliament, the director and the chairmen of the commissions for foreign affairs, defense and internal affairs; from the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the SM [Council of Ministers], the ministers of defense (a civilian) and internal affairs, the chairman and chief of staff of the people's home guard and the director of the security service. Other officials may be added as the need arises. The State Defense Council may announce a general mobilization and, if necessary, martial law in the nation.

The Defense Forces are directed by the commander in peacetime. We do not plan to set up separate staffs and agencies of control for the different troop arms. There is no need for that. Everything will be decided through the Ministry of Defense, in which corresponding departments will perform administrative and technical tasks, resolve matters pertaining to materials and equipment

support, personnel and so forth, for the border troops, sailors, airmen and PVO forces.

[Plotnikov] The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers will want to know about the implementation of the Law on Compulsory Military Duty and the training of officer cadres. Are there difficulties in these areas?

[Alksnis] First, about the essence of the law. The plans call for active duty and service in a state reserve. Active duty is in turn broken down into regular and labor (alternative) service. Men between the ages of 19 and 50 will be drafted into the military service. Young people up to the age of 25 will be drafted into the regular service, while individuals older than this will make up the mobilization reserve. The first-term regular service period is 18 months; labor service, 24 months; six months for individuals with a higher education. There are also provisions for serving under contract.

A multistage, separate and combined system for training specialists is planned for the republic. Soldiers will first train at training centers, for example, and then perfect their specialty in the subunits.

Officer training is more complicated. We have practically no junior or mid-level officers. We urgently established the National Defense Academy. In the beginning we plan to train platoon-company level officers there, primarily for the border troops, mobile motorized infantry subunits, support and supply subunits, and people's home guard formations. In the second phase we plan to train officers in the main occupations using a military school program. These officers will be taken from among the best-prepared soldiers and junior commanders who have served at least a year. After the Defense Forces are manned with junior officers, we shall begin training some of them (after they have served 3-5 years) in an academic program to become commanders. We plan to train officers for the occupations in which there is a shortage at foreign military educational institutions.

I would mention the fact that officer positions may be held only by citizens of the Latvian Republic, and they must be fluent in the Latvian language. Incidentally, we presently have several young Russians studying at the National Defense Academy who fully meet these requirements.

In general, the concept of defense and the orientation of our military development demonstrate the Latvian Republic's desire to live in friendship, harmony and peace with its neighbors, with whom we are linked by many centuries of history.

ARMS TRADE

Rosnitskiy Argues Arms Sales not Beneficial to Economy

92UM1324A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Oleg Rosnitskiy: "Myths Surrounding Arms Exports: 'The War Party' Thirsts To Trade Death"]

[Text]

Disarmament

VPK [military-industrial complex] figures, scholars and journalists are once again widely discussing the problems of arms exports: the former propagandize it, then the scholars discuss it, and finally the latter have sided with either the one or the other. In the process, it is already a question not simply of the sale of the mountains of arms that have accumulated but about the production of new and still more competitive arms on the world market and about the sales of arms because, as it has become clear, we have accumulated so much arms that it does not appear possible that we can either sell or scrap them; arms are spontaneously crawling away throughout the CIS and their bloody traces are visible everywhere.

Champions of arms sales propagandize them as an means for a good cause—to provide investments in conversion and, as for the politicians and ethics—they say, everyone sells arms and we are not to blame. Others go so far as to say that the military-industrial complex cannot devastate the country but feed it. In the process, a multitude of myths which easily deceive the unsophisticated man are being set into motion.

The First Myth: It is advantageous to sell arms. They cite data that, in the last decade, we received two dollars from these sales for each ruble spent. The average reader, knowing that the Russian government recently valued the dollar at R125 experiences a slight shock at that. But there's no secret here: the state has appropriated its hard currency profits and has paid the producers with "wooden rubles". Expenditures for the production of arms are calculated at reduced domestic prices when the military-industrial complex has paid a plug nickel for labor, raw materials, fuel-energy and other resources or generally hasn't paid anything at all (for example, for natural resources) but the bureaucrats have sold arms on the external market at world prices. Right now, when we are attempting to become integrated in the world economy and when we are releasing domestic prices which are nearing world prices, having increased by a factor of 10, we need to take leave of this myth. Yes and how could the military-industrial complex that is stricken through and through by the command-administrative system, create an oasis of profitability? Here we are not touching upon the problems of sales losses in credit with our former ideological comrades-in-arms who will already never settle accounts with us.

The Second Myth: Revenue from arms sales will allow us to conduct conversion. According to the calculations of Russian presidential advisors, we need \$150 billion to conduct conversion. Let's compare that figure with our capabilities. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the value of arms sales on the world market in 1991 totaled \$22.1 billion of which the U.S.'s share, which occupies first place in this business, is nearly half—\$11.2 billion; we occupied sixth place—our total sales fell from \$9.7 billion to \$3.9 billion. Let's assume that, having unleashed a new race for parity with the United States, we will return "with dignity" to the world arms market and once again attain total sales of approximately \$10 billion per year. What portion of that sum can we spend on conversion? If we want to build a civilized market, we must admit that these proceeds belong to the arms manufacturers. From these proceeds, they must make up for all expenditures for production and marketing, settle accounts with suppliers, pay duties and taxes, withhold a portion of the profits in reserve and other funds and, finally, they will be able to invest some part of it in the development or retooling of production. If this retooling is directed at national economic needs, these will also be investments in conversion. In a normal market economy, these investments, according to our assessments, total only several percent of the proceeds and, in order to obtain the required \$150 billion, we will need to sell arms for about 200 years! Of course, we can assume that the military-industrial complex plans to withdraw its entire hard currency profit from the producers of competitive arms and to put it into the conversion of enterprises that are not capable of producing competitive arms. But even in this case with the value of sales of approximately \$10 billion under conditions of fierce competition, the profit, according to the assessments of independent experts, will total no more than \$2-3 billion so that, using this method, we will have to "earn" money for conversion for no less than 50 years. Things are even getting worse. In order to stay afloat in this new race, as before we will have to finance numerous NII's [Scientific Research Institutes] and KB's [design bureaus] and demand from them the increased competitiveness of our arms on the world market and this is more complicated than the previous arms race which made less strict demands in this regard.

The Third Myth: Arms sellers would feed us, if the politicians wouldn't interfere with them. Here we have to quote: "We have to pay for so-called humanitarian assistance with political concessions. As a result, we are also supporting the UN resolution on Libya and have refused arms deliveries, as a result of which only Russia has suffered economically. Previously, having supported the UN decision, we moved against Iraq, with whom we had always had profitable cooperation... We should have at least abstained during the voting at the UN" (KURANTY, July 2, 1992). So it turns out that for Husayn, who was defeated and driven out of Kuwait, and Qadhafi, who is being blockaded by the world community, today there wouldn't be any other concerns

but to continue the "profitable cooperation" with us in the purchase of arms! Naturally, the equivalent of a policy with the priority of universal values is not hardly the cost of humanitarian assistance but Russia's inclusion in the world economy, right up to the formation of the "Big Eight" with its participation. Well, and if someone wants to assign a priority to income from arms sales, now they can expand to other markets: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and that same Kuwait. So, don't grieve, enthusiasts!

The Fourth Myth: State bureaucrats must sell arms, arms manufacturers only interfere with business. This myth, just like the first three, has also been created by the bureaucracy of the militarized state which robbed all manufacturers, including arms manufacturers, while uncontrollably handling their incomes. The workers who produced the weapons and other export goods, just like the oil drillers who ensured the influx of oil dollars, didn't receive anything from this export either for their own sector or for themselves personally. Not simply the profits but the entire hard currency revenue were distributed somewhere far away and high and floated away into quite other spheres. The close company of the sellers and the "distributors" very much want to continue their clean and profitable activities. These "professionals" literally scream from the pages of newspapers, complaining about the arms manufacturers who allegedly "dream" about independently selling arms.

We sympathize with the workers of narrowly-specialized defense enterprises who have never manufactured anything other than arms and other military products and who have found themselves in a disastrous situation. Therefore, we have to agree with the fact that we have to resort to arms sales to mitigate the socio-economic upheavals during the retooling of these industries but it is ineffective not only in a political and ethical sense but also in an economic sense to unleash the next arms race. This race does not have any prospects.

We have already had the opportunity to write about what the future may be. We will briefly repeat it: not arms sales, but inclusion of conversion in the general flow of economic reform of which privatization is the most important element. We need to legislatively open the possibility for investment of domestic and foreign private capital in conversion and guarantee its safety. Investment plans of both Russian and foreign companies are increasing but are not being realized as a result of legislative restrictions. For an example, let's cite the recent statement of Ex- U.S. President Nixon who assesses the investment plans of American business at \$300- 400 billion and in the background of which \$150 billion for conversion does not seem to be so frightening. Of course, state interference in the defense industry will always be present. That is associated with the military doctrine and with the development of fundamentally new types of weapons, but in spite of any type of super-secrecy, this presence must have the nature of an economic partnership.

Quite a bit has been said about the role of our military-industrial complex in the life of the country and the people. According to Mikhail Gorbachev's recent admission, we must seek the root of many difficulties in that resistance which the circles associated with the military-industrial complex which are accustomed to unlimited financing exerted against reform. Let's recall in this regard that four of the eight members of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] were the highest military-industrial complex leaders. But here's a very much fresher statement of the just designated Vice Premier of Russia: "And it is absurd to place the life of the most important plants under the slogan of conversion. The military-industrial complex is the flower of national industry... The state's duty (my duty!) is to make it so that these mighty enterprises develop" (IZVESTIYA, May 23, 1992). Well, but my duty is to say that the resistance continues.

Rumored Sale of Backfire, MIG-29, MIG-31 to Iran

92UM1320A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 92 Morning Edition pp 1,4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Yuriy Kovalenko, Paris: "Russia Is Preparing to Sell 110 Combat Aircraft to Iran, Asserts LE MOND, Citing Western Intelligence Services"]

[Text] According to Western and Israeli intelligence data, Russia is conducting negotiations with Iran on the delivery of nearly 110 combat aircraft—12 TU-22M's, 48 MIG-29's, 24 MIG-31's, 24 MIG-27's, and 2 IL-76 radar aircraft.

If this deal for a total sum of \$11 billion takes place, writes LE MOND, it will increase Teheran's air force potential by 40 percent. Right now Teheran has 270 aircraft at its disposal (of them, half are unserviceable due to a lack of spare parts). Furthermore, with Russia's help, the Iranian authorities are counting on bringing nearly 110-115 Iraqi Soviet-built aircraft to a state of combat readiness which were transferred to Iran by Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War in order to shelter them from the bombings. Finally, Teheran is displaying interest in Soviet SAM-5, SAM-11, and SAM-13 surface-to-air missiles.

The rearming of Iran, in which China, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], and certain Eastern European countries are participating along with Russia, is causing concern in the Western states. LE MOND reports that during the last two years Russia has already sold several hundred tanks and also 20 MIG-29's to Iran at extremely low prices.

Western intelligence services are simultaneously intently tracking Teheran's attempts, alone or with the help of partners, to set up the production of its own missiles. In the process, its military-industrial complex is displaying an interest in nuclear and chemical weapons. Created during the years of the monarchy with the support of the

United States and other Western powers, this military-industrial complex now operates jointly with the DPRK and China.

With Pyongyang's assistance, Teheran has mastered the production of two types of missiles with a flight range of 480 and 1,000 kilometers. In its turn, Beijing has supplied it with other varieties of missiles, including the M-11. These two countries have helped Iran to construct several military plants in cities that are located near the borders of the former USSR and Afghanistan, far from the possible Iraqi threat. In Shakhrud, Tabas, Semnan, and alongside Mashhad, the Iranians, states LE MOND, from all appearances, have a significant industrial potential at their disposal for the development of missiles, the production of tanks, artillery pieces, and every possible type of ammunition.

And finally. In Western capitals, they suspect China and India of helping Iran to master nuclear technology. So, the Chinese have agreed to supply a nuclear reactor "for scientific purposes" which will be located in Isfahan. However, D. Jennekeno [transliterated], one of the leaders of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated that there are no grounds whatsoever to suspect Teheran of intending to use the nuclear program for military purposes after a visit to Iran with an inspection mission at the beginning of this year.

Nevertheless, LE MOND points out that the Western intelligence services, recalling the Baghdad precedent, remain on guard. In the opinion of experts, any state, if it does not commit any obvious mistakes, can keep its nuclear secrets secret, despite all of the IAEA's inspections.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Commentaries on Plans to Recruit Russians for Foreign Legion

92UM1312A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Porokhov and Colonel Valeriy Streltsov: "Will Russians Go Into the Foreign Legion?"]

[Text] The substantial difficulties which our nation is experiencing in the economy and the social protection of the public has contributed to the appearance of not only those who are ready to extend a helping hand to us but also "friends" of another sort. Recently we happened to read an interview in one of the St. Petersburg newspapers with the chairman of the international consortium Peter Service Bureau, I. Eynar.

In it Mr. Eynar revealed his plans to man the French Foreign Legion with Russian natives. In particular, he

proposed opening in the city on the Neva an intermediary office which would recruit "physically healthy males under the age of 35." The conditions: four months of "training," then the signing of a contract for five years and three of these would be served in one of the French colonies.

To say the least, the action of the Peter Service Bureau is unusual. Will Russia become the supplier of mercenaries for the international market or will it prevent this? Here are two comments on this question.

Major-General Anatoliy Obukhov, military commissar of St. Petersburg:

As far as I know the history of our Fatherland, its sons have never been hired by another state for military service merely for money. Yes, the representatives of our motherland have fought under foreign colors. But either they were forced to do this out of extenuating circumstances or following their own ideological convictions. But here you have a completely different situation. According to the current legislation, all citizens who are liable for military service are to be registered in the draft and for a particular period have a specific task. What is the case here? I feel that clarity should be provided here by the supreme legislative body of Russia. As for the draft contingent, I am convinced that its primary purpose is to defend the interests of their state. All the more as in the Russian Army there are still many problems in recruiting personnel for regular service.

Viktor Sidorchenko, doctor of legal sciences, professor and head of the Chair of International Law at the Legal Faculty of St. Petersburg State University:

The holding of more than one job is prohibited for the military. Particularly so for the recruitment into a foreign army. Here from the legal viewpoint everything is clear. But for the other citizens it is not so simple. And the guilty party in this irregularity is the Russian legislation. There is the question of leaving. A person who gives the reason for leaving to serve in a foreign legion will scarcely be given a visa. But the key point is something else, as the law prevents a Russian citizen from serving in the army of a foreign state. Nor must we disregard that fact that those who have left to "earn their way" in a foreign army may end up in a situation where they, as mercenaries, are forced to fight against their motherland. It is illegal to have even the activities of recruiting or middleman firms for recruiting mercenaries on the territory of Russia. In addition to this, there should be the corresponding agreements between states on this question. As far as I know, Russia and France have not signed such an agreement.

In order to obtain the final word on the arising situation, we phoned the French Consulate in St. Petersburg. "We do not have any information on the given firm," said a co-worker. "You yourselves must establish the legality of its activities and powers."

[Editors' Note.]

The name of Mr. Eynar has again appeared on the pages of the St. Petersburg newspapers. In particular, the newspaper CHAS PIK published an interview with him and in which he said literally the following: "We have already purchased an office in St. Petersburg and we do not intend to abandon our plans. The question merely is how strong will the opposition be?"

And also who will stop the French "missionary"?

Loss of Kuriles Would Place U.S. Carriers Beyond Range of Pacfleet Air

92UM1348A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 2

[Extract from Russian Navy Main Staff document opposing transfer of Kuriles to Japan by Rear Admiral Kaysin: "The Naval Main Staff Agrees with the General Staff: Rear Admiral Kaysin Asserts That 'It Is Inadvisable To Discuss the Transfer of Even Part of the Southern Kurile Islands to Japan'". (...) indicates passages omitted in original.]

[Text]

Document

(This document is being published in abridged form)

1. Naval Fleet Force Composition in the Southern Kuriles

(...) Total Pacific Ocean Fleet personnel strength is approximately 430 men, including 40 officers, 60 army and naval warrant officers, 65 workers and employees, and up to 265 compulsory service military personnel.

That minimum required Pacific Ocean Fleet force composition supports:

- the safety of navigation system;
- monitoring the situation in the Southern Kurile Islands area; and,
- defense against amphibious assault of the islands in cooperation with Ground Forces units.

If necessary, the Pacific Ocean Fleet force composition can be augmented by transporting troops from Kamchatka, Sakhalin Island or the Primorskiy Kray.

2. The Military-Political Situation Surrounding the Southern Kuriles

The military-political situation in the northwestern portion of the Pacific Ocean is determined by the permanent presence in the region of a significant contingent of U.S. and Japanese armed forces and the unresolved nature of international-legal and territorial issues.

Special attention and significance in this region is imparted to the problem of the Southern Kurile Islands.

Japan's military policy is structured in accordance with the officially adopted concept of "comprehensive national security". Consolidating the military alliance and expanding military cooperation with the United States and the buildup of its own military potential are its main directions.

Despite the changes that have occurred in the world and the disintegration of the USSR, Japan's military doctrine continues to have an anti-Russian orientation and defines Russia as the primary enemy. The "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security" of January 19, 1990 [sic—1960] which was automatically extended in 1975, forms the treaty and legal foundation of Japanese-American allied relations.

The American ships and aircraft that are constantly based in Japan in accordance with this treaty include: an aircraft carrier with 6-8 escort ships at the port of Yokosuka, four missile ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles (during peacetime, these ships constantly have on board up to 160 Tomahawk cruise missiles with a firing range of up to 1,500 kilometers against naval and up to 2,300 kilometers against coastal targets).

(...) Under conditions of the continuing economic crisis in the CIS countries and the drastic reduction of resources for defense, the reduction of Russia's armed forces and the reduction of their combat capability, Japan has significantly increased its military activity.

Along with diplomatic pressure against Russia, Japan is building up the country's military potential while annually increasing military appropriations (by an average of six percent).

(...) Analysis of the activities of the Japanese and U.S. armed forces in the northwestern portion of the Pacific Ocean indicates an increase of coordination of the parties' activities to train their armed forces for joint operations in the Far East. The intensity and scale of Japanese and U.S. joint naval exercises has increased.

(...) Operations to blockade Russia's Pacific Ocean Fleet ship bases, search and destroy missions against our submarines and surface ships deployed at sea, operations to blockade the straits areas to prevent the deployment of Pacific Ocean Fleet forces from their bases, and amphibious assault operations for the seizure of islands are being rehearsed during the course of joint American-Japanese exercises.

In all exercises, special attention is being devoted to search and destroy missions against our strategic submarines. In the process, we must note that the operations against them are being carried out not only during exercises but continuously during peacetime. Four-five American antisubmarine warfare submarines are constantly near our nuclear submarine bases on Kamchatka and the Primorskiy Kray, and also in their patrols areas and U.S. and Japanese ASW ships and aircraft conduct systematic searches for our submarines. (...)

3. The Significance of the Southern Kurile Islands for the Defense of Russia's Far East

Analysis of the orientation of exercises, the scale and areas of their conduct, and the training and daily activities of the U.S. and Japanese armed forces in the Far East indicate that they are conducting rehearsals of variations of joint operations against our troop formations in the Far East. In the process, the American and Japanese joint operations concept of operations provides for the seizure of the Southern Kuriles, the blockade of the La Perouse and Kurile straits to dismember the Pacific Ocean Fleet into two parts, disruption of the sea lines of communication that link the mainland with Sakhalin and Kamchatka and then to destroy the fleet's ship forces, especially ocean strategic nuclear forces in the Sea of Okhotsk and on Kamchatka. (...)

The Americans and Japanese understand very well that the Kurile Islands' strait areas may be closed (blockaded, mined) for passage of their naval forces into the Sea of Okhotsk in the event of extraordinary circumstances. Proceeding based on that, Russia's return of the so-called "northern territories" (the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Lesser Kuriles Chain) has exceptionally important significance for them.

The transfer of the islands to Japan will permit them to obtain free, uncontrolled by Russian forces, passage into the Sea of Okhotsk through Yekaterina Strait (between the islands of Iturup and Kunashir). The Americans will obtain the capability for unimpeded deployment of their forces into the Sea of Okhotsk (without the need to seize the Kurile Island Chain or to sweep the straits in our minefields), and the Japanese will expand their capabilities to blockade the La Perouse Strait and to conduct operations of their forces in the southern portion of the Sea of Okhotsk right up to deployment of fighter aviation aircraft at Iturup Island's airfields. Existing and newly created airfields on the Southern Kuriles will permit the deployment of ASW aircraft on them which will monitor the situation in the entire Sea of Okhotsk and on the approaches to Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands. So, in this case U.S. and Japanese naval operations to monitor our strategic submarine operations in the Sea of Okhotsk and on the approaches to Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands will be more effective and will require fewer expenditures.

Furthermore, analysis of U.S. Navy aircraft carrier operations during the course of exercises in which they rehearse conducting strikes against the Primorskiy Kray and Sakhalin Island indicate that the area west of the Sangarskiy Strait is the main secure area for them. That area is well protected from the overflight of our aircraft by Japan's PVO [Air Defense] system and by ASW force operations on the Pacific Ocean side. In order to reach aircraft carriers in that area, our aircraft need to fly around Japan outside the effective zone of its Air Defense (over Sakhalin and the northern portion of the Southern Kuriles) and conduct strikes against aircraft carriers from the Pacific Ocean side.

In the event of the transfer of the Southern Kuriles to Japan, Japan's Air Defense System will be significantly expanded to the north and our aircraft do not have the combat radius to fly around it.

So, U.S. and Japanese naval strike forces, which can operate against the Primorskiy Kray and Sakhalin from the area north of the Sangarskiy Strait, will become invulnerable to our forces.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Japan's growing economic and military might is leading to the increase of political, military and economic pressure against Russia due to the presence of the disputed issue on the ownership of the southern islands of the Kurile chain.

2. While proceeding from Russia's security interests, it would be inadvisable to discuss the transfer of even part of the Southern Kurile Islands to Japan at the present time.

SECURITY SERVICES

Lack of Equipment, Authority Hamper Work of Border Troops

92UM1273C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
7 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Yevgeniy Khorunzhiy under the rubric "Problems of the Border Service": "When a Trend Takes Shape"]

[Text] The border brings something new every day, sometimes the totally unexpected. After a time you become convinced that this new thing will be followed by something even newer, and a trend begins to take shape.

I recall telling in one of my articles how several Hungarian boys "landed" on our shore to get a look at a border marker-post, and later some youth—our own, Ukrainian youth this time—tried to ford the Dunay in the area of Ismail and "conquer" the Romanian bank.

Three boys (two of them 15 years old, the third 14) arrived in the town of Nemirov in the Lvov area from Kiev. They had an acquaintance named Yura there with his own apartment. They settled down in it. They did not play games with Yura; they told him honestly and precisely why they had come. They needed to sell a set of Soviet anniversary ruble coins for 1,000 dollars, either in Poland or to a foreigner here. Yura's friends came to his apartment and briefed the boys:

"Don't hang around villages near the border, boys. Someone will start to get nosy, for sure."

"And try to have as little contact with the locals as possible," Another added.

"Get through the barbed wire as quickly as possible. Don't dally at the start. And leave the border immediately."

The visitors proved to be not only good listeners, but very bright as well.

When they set out toward the border, the spirit of the romantic overcame the business spirit for a time, but after that everything returned to normal.

At one farm, at approximately 10:00 P.M., they met an old woman (84 years old, it was later learned).

"How do we get to the next village?" one of the boys asked her.

The old woman indicated the direction with a finger and then pointed in the opposite direction and warned them:

"Don't go there. There is a cordon over there."

That was just what they needed.

After spending the night in the woods, at the first break of day, the "seekers of fortune" rushed through the signal system.

This story has a simple ending. Some time later Polish border troops turned the boys over to Ukrainian border authorities.

What were the parents doing? This is the first thing which entered my mind when I heard of the incident. Indeed, what were they doing? Nothing. The parents were just indulging their beloved offspring. How else does one explain the fact that the mother of one of the "travelers" had known about her son's desire to exchange ruble coins for dollars, and in her own way even urged him to barter them. The father of a second, an officer, was stationed in Kiev. Just tell me, if you will, who, if not he, should have brought up his son to be disciplined and law-abiding. He did not. He lacked either the know-how or the desire.

Parents are parents, though (these days counting on a good upbringing for the upcoming generation is like expecting mercy from nature), but we need to acknowledge that there are many other real factors helping in one degree or another to destabilize the border. First of all there is the infamous border zone. We certainly do not need to be suspicious in all things today, but the absence of a legal basis for the border zone prevents us from monitoring to any extent at all those coming in from the

immediate border area (and there are a great many of them, believe me). Some regimented areas clearly are needed.

In addition to this, our border laws clearly do not come up to the international level. Today there can be no doubt that the border troops should be vested with the authority also to levy real fines against individuals violating the established order and to cancel visas in some cases.

In some sectors there are clearly not enough officers and warrant officers for working among the population to reveal potential border violators on the distant approaches to the border. People do not want to work here. There are no apartments and the wages are small. Judge for yourself. Far be it from me to belittle workers in other fields, but an officer receives the same pay as a worker at a kindergarten. And some citizens simply prefer business. I was told that in the village of Shegini glasses of ordinary water are sold to foreigners for a dollar a glass. I have also been told that the precious water sells so well one can end up with a pocketful of greenbacks for a barrel in a day's time.

We must also have closer contacts with the Polish side. After all, the time is not far off when the electrical signaling systems will be eliminated entirely. Incidentally, we could learn something from the border troops of our next-door neighbor. They perform their job with excellence.

The materials and equipment support for the cordon guard also leaves something to be desired. It was far simpler in the past. The post chief simply went to the local organization and took what he needed. If, contrary to expectations, something was not given to him, there would be a call to the party raykom and the matter would be resolved in favor of the border guards. Much has changed today. You get nothing with your looks: not cement, not lumber, not gasoline, not spare parts. The possibilities of barter have loomed up for the commanders. But what are they to barter? The border? No, that would not do. Our officers would not go in for that. So....

So we need centralized deliveries of everything needed to the border.

One last thing. For many years we bowed down before a single ideology. It is now dead. A new one has not come into being. In the meantime the people are giving their preference to material incentives.

A trend is taking shape. So what? That is the way it will always be.

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